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Abstract
Anonymous social media platforms like Secret, Yik Yak, and Whisper have emerged as important tools for sharing ideas
without the fear of judgment. Such anonymous platforms are also important in nations under authoritarian rule, where freedom of
expression and the personal safety of message authors may depend on anonymity. Whether for fear of judgment or retribution, it
is sometimes crucial to hide the identities of users who post sensitive messages. In this paper, we consider a global adversary who
wishes to identify the author of a message; it observes either a snapshot of the spread of a message at a certain time, sampled
timestamp metadata, or both. Recent advances in rumor source detection show that existing messaging protocols are vulnerable
against such an adversary. We introduce a novel messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, and show that under
the snapshot adversarial model, adaptive diffusion spreads content fast and achieves perfect obfuscation of the source when the
underlying contact network is an infinite regular tree. That is, all users with the message are nearly equally likely to have been
the origin of the message. When the contact network is an irregular tree, we characterize the probability of maximum likelihood
detection by proving a concentration result over Galton-Watson trees. Experiments on a sampled Facebook network demonstrate
that adaptive diffusion effectively hides the location of the source even when the graph is finite, irregular and has cycles.
Index Terms
privacy, diffusion, anonymous social media.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microblogging platforms are central to the fabric of the present Internet; popular examples include Twitter and Facebook. In
such platforms, users propagate short messages (texts, images, videos) over a contact graph, which represents a social network
in most cases. Message forwarding often occurs through built-in mechanisms that rely on user input, such as clicking “like" or
“share" on a particular post. Brevity of message, fluidity of user interface, and trusted party communication combine to make
these microblogging platforms a major communication mode of modern times.
However, the popularity of microblogging services also makes them a prime target for invasive user monitoring by employers,
service providers, or government agencies. This monitoring typically exploits metadata: non-content data that characterizes
content, like timestamps. Metadata can often be as sensitive as data itself [1], [2]; this reality was publicized by Michael
Hayden, former Director of the CIA, with his observation that “We kill people based on metadata" [3].
The alarming privacy implications of these platforms has spurred the growth of anonymous microblogging platforms, like
Whisper [4], Yik Yak [5], and the now-defunct Secret [6]. These platforms enable users to share messages with their friends
without revealing authorship metadata.
Existing anonymous messaging services store both messages and authorship information on centralized servers, which makes
them vulnerable to government subpoenas, hacking, or direct company access. An alternative solution would be to store this
information in a distributed fashion; each node would know only its own friends, and message authorship information would
never be transmitted to any party. Distributed systems are more robust to monitoring due to lack of central points of failure.
However, even under distributed architectures, simple anonymous messaging protocols (such as those used by commercial
anonymous microblogging apps) are still vulnerable against an adversary with side information, as proved in recent advances
in rumor source detection [7], [8]. In this work, we study a basic building block of the messaging protocol that would underpin
truly anonymous microblogging platform – how to anonymously broadcast a single message on a contact network, even in the
face of a strong deanonymizing adversary with access to metadata. Specifically, we focus on anonymous microblogging built
atop an underlying social network, such as a network of phone contacts or Facebook friends.
Adversaries. We consider three adversarial models, which capture different approaches to collecting metadata. In each case,
the underlying contact network is modeled as a graph that is known to the adversary. Beyond that, the adversary could proceed
in a few different ways.
The adversary might use side channels to infer whether a node is infected, i.e., whether it received the message. If an
adversary collects only infection metadata for all network users, we call it a snapshot adversary. This could represent a
state-level adversary that attends a Twitter-organized protest; it implicitly learns who received the protest advertisement by
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2observing which individuals are physically present, but not the associated metadata. The snapshot adversary is well-studied
in the literature, primarily in the related problem of source identification [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]. We focus primarily on the
snapshot adversarial model in this paper.
Alternatively, the adversary might explicitly corrupt some fraction of nodes by bribery or coercion; these corrupted spy
nodes could pass along metadata like message timestamps and relay IDs. If an adversary only collects information from spies,
we call it a spy-based adversary. A spy-based adversary could represent a government agency participating in social media
to study users, for instance. The adversary’s reach may be limited by factors like account creation, contact network structure
[13], or the cost of corrupting participants. This adversarial model is discussed in detail in [14], but we include the relevant
theoretical results in this paper for the sake of completeness.
Finally, an adversary could combine the spy-based and snapshot adversarial models by using both forms of metadata. If
an adversary uses spies and a snapshot, we call it a spy+snapshot adversary. This adversarial model allows us to study the
capabilities of both snapshot and spy metadata types, combining the results on snapshot adversary capabilities derived here
with those of spy adversary capabilities derived in in [14].
Spreading models. In social networks, messages are typically propagated based on users’ approval, which is expressed via
liking, sharing or retweeting. This mechanism, which enables social filtering and reduces spam, has inherent random delays
associated with each user’s time of impression and decision to “like" the message (or not). Standard models of rumor spreading
in networks explicitly model such random delays via a diffusion process: messages are spread independently over different
edges with a fixed probability of spreading (discrete time model) or an exponential spreading time (continuous time model).
The designer can partially control the spreading rate by introducing artificial delays on top of the usual random delays due to
users’ approval of the messages.
We model this physical setup as a discrete-time system. At time t = 0, a single user v∗ ∈ V starts to spread a message over
the contact network G = (V,E) where users and contacts are represented by nodes and edges, respectively. Upon receiving
the message, nodes approve it immediately. The assumption that all nodes are willing to approve and pass the message is
common in rumor spreading analysis [7], [15], [16]. However, by assuming message approval is immediate, we abstract away
the natural random delays typically modeled by diffusion. At the following timestep, the protocol decides which neighbors will
receive the message, and how much propagation delay to introduce. Given this control, the system designer wishes to design
a spreading protocol that makes message source inference difficult.
Specifically, after T timesteps, let VT ⊆ V , GT , and NT , |VT | denote the set of infected nodes, the subgraph of G containing
only VT , and the number of infected nodes, respectively. at a given time T , the adversary uses all available metadata to estimate
the source. We assume no prior knowledge of the source, so the adversary computes a maximum-likelihood (ML) estimate of
the source vˆML. We desire a spreading protocol that minimizes the probability of detection PD = P(vˆML = v∗).
Current state-of-the-art: Diffusion is commonly used to model epidemic propagation over contact networks. While simplistic
(it ignores factors like individual user preferences), diffusion is a commonly-studied and useful model due to its simplicity and
first-order approximation of actual propagation dynamics. Critically, it captures the symmetric spreading used by most social
media platforms.
However, diffusion has been shown to exhibit poor anonymity properties; under the adversarial models we consider, the
source can be identified reliably [7], [8]. We therefore seek a different spreading model with strong anonymity guarantees. We
wish to achieve the following performance metrics:
(a) We say a protocol has an order-optimal rate of spread if the expected time for the message to reach n nodes scales
linearly compared to the time required by the fastest spreading protocol.
(b) We say a protocol achieves a perfect obfuscation if the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood
estimator is order-optimal. The definition of optimality differs for different adversarial models, so we define this metric
separately for each adversarial model.
Contributions. We introduce adaptive diffusion, a novel messaging protocol with provable author anonymity guarantees against
all of the discussed adversarial models. Whereas diffusion spreads the message symmetrically in all directions, adaptive diffusion
breaks that symmetry (Figure 1). This has different implications for different adversarial models, but it consistently yields
stronger anonymity guarantees than diffusion. Adaptive diffusion is also inherently distributed and spreads messages fast, i.e.,
the time it takes adaptive diffusion to reach n users is at most twice the time it takes the fastest spreading scheme which
immediately passes the message to all its neighbors.
We prove that over d-regular trees, adaptive diffusion provides perfect obfuscation of the source under the snapshot adversarial
model. That is, the likelihood of an infected user being the source of the infection is equal among all infected users. We derive
exact expressions for the probability of detection, and show that this expression is optimal for the snapshot adversary by
providing a matching fundamental lower bound.
In practice, the contact networks are not regular infinite trees. For a general class of graphs which can be finite, irregular
and have cycles, we provide results of numerical experiments on real-world social networks and synthetic networks showing
that the protocol hides the source at nearly the best possible level of obfuscation under the snapshot adversarial model. The
3Fig. 1: Illustration of a spread of infection when spreading immediately (left) and under adaptive diffusion (right).
same is true for spy-based adversaries; such simulation results for that adversarial model are discussed in [14]. Further, for a
specific family of random irregular infinite trees, known as Galton-Watson trees, we characterize the probability of detection
under adaptive diffusion and a snapshot adversary. In the process, we prove a strong concentration for the extreme paths in
the Galton-Watson tree that consists of nodes with large degrees, which might be of independent interest.
Finally, we characterize the probability of maximum likelihood detection of adaptive diffusion in various edge cases, such
as when the adversary can take multiple snapshots, and when the underlying graph contains regular cycles, as in an infinite
lattice graph.
Related work. Anonymous communication has been a popular research topic for decades. For instance, anonymous point-to-
point communication allows a sender to communicate with a receiver without the receiver learning the sender’s identity. A
great deal of work has emerged in this area, including Tor [17], Freenet [18], Free Haven [19], and Tarzan [20]. In contrast to
this body of work, we address the problem of anonymously broadcasting a message over an underlying contact network (e.g.,
a network of Facebook friendships or phone contacts).
Anonymous broadcast communication has been most studied in context of the dining cryptographers’ (DC) problem. We
diverge from the literature on this topic [21], [22], [23], [24], [25] in approach and formulation. We consider statistical
spreading models rather than cryptographic encodings, accommodate computationally unbounded adversaries, and consider
domain-specific contact networks rather than a fully connected communication network.
Recently, Riposte addressed a similar problem of anonymously writing to a public message board [26]. It uses techniques from
private information retrieval to store multiple, corrupted copies of messages on distributed servers. This corruption is designed
so that no subset of colluding servers can determine the author. However, Riposte places no restrictions on communication
with the servers, thereby facilitating spam. Differences in the communication model and adversarial model prevent Riposte
from effectively solving our problem of interest.
Within the realm of statistical message spreading models, the problem of detecting the origin of an epidemic or the source
of a rumor has been studied under the diffusion model. Recent advances in [7], [15], [9], [10], [11], [12], [16], [27], [28],
[29], [30], [31] show that it is possible to identify the source within a few hops with high probability. Consider an adversary
who has access to the underlying contact network of friendship links and the snapshot of infected nodes at a certain time. The
problem of locating a rumor source, first posed in [7], naturally corresponds to graph-centrality-based inference algorithms:
for a continuous time model, [7], [15] used the rumor centrality measure to correctly identify the source after time T (with
probability converging to a positive number for large d-regular and random trees, and with probability proportional to 1/
√
T
for lines). The probability of identifying the source increases even further when multiple infections from the same source are
observed [9]. With multiple sources of infections, spectral methods have been proposed for estimating the number of sources
and the set of source nodes in [10], [11]. When infected nodes are allowed to recover as in the susceptible-infected-recovered
(SIR) model, Jordan centrality was proposed in [12], [16] to estimate the source. In [16], it is shown that the Jordan center is
still within a bounded hop distance from the true source with high probability, independent of the number of infected nodes.
When the adversary collects timestamps (and other metadata) from spy nodes, standard diffusion reveals the location of the
source [8], [16], [32]. However, ML estimation is known to be NP-hard [33], and analyzing the probability of detection is also
challenging. the source can be effectively identified.
In summary, under natural, diffusion-based message spreading—as seen in almost every content-sharing platform today—an
adversary with some side information can identify the rumor source with high confidence. We overcome this vulnerability
by asking the reverse question: can we design messaging protocols that spread fast while protecting the anonymity of the
source? Related challenges include (a) identifying the best algorithm that the adversary might use to infer the location of
the source; (b) providing analytical guarantees for the proposed spreading model; and (c) identifying the fundamental limit
on what any spreading model can achieve. We address all of these challenges for snapshot adversarial model (Section III),
spy-based adversarial model (Section IV), and finally the spy+snapshot model (Section V). In this paper, our primarily focus
is on the snapshot adversarial model; the spy-based and spy+snapshot adversaries are discussed in detail in [14].
4Our work fits into a larger ecosystem that enables anonymous messaging; we implicitly assume that the ecosystem is healthy.
For instance, we assume that nodes communicate securely in a distributed fashion, but anonymity-preserving, peer-to-peer (P2P)
address lookup is still an active research area [34], as is privacy-preserving distributed data storage in P2P systems [35]. We do
not consider adversaries that operate below the application layer (e.g., by monitoring the network or even physical layer) [36],
[37]. Lower-level solutions may be more appropriate against such an opponent, harnessing factors like physical proximity of
users [38]. In that space, physical layer security and privacy attacks pose a very real threat, as has been documented extensively
in prior work [39], [40], [41].
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: To begin, we introduce the general adaptive diffusion
protocol in Section II. In Section III, we describe how to specialize adaptive diffusion under a snapshot adversarial model. In
Section IV, we describe how to apply adaptive diffusion under a spy-based adversarial model. Combining the key insights of
these two approaches, we introduce results from the spy+snapshot adversarial model in Section V. For each adversarial model,
we first describe the precise version of adaptive diffusion that applies to infinite d-regular trees, and show that it achieves
perfect obfuscation of the source. We then provide extensions to irregular trees. We conclude by presenting simulated results
over real graphs: finite, irregular, and containing cycles. In Section VI, we make a connection between adaptive diffusion on
a line and Pólya’s urn processes. This connection, while interesting in itself, provides a novel analysis technique for precisely
capturing the price of control packets that are passed along with the messages in order to coordinate the spread of messages
as per adaptive diffusion.
II. ADAPTIVE DIFFUSION
In this section, we describe adaptive diffusion in its most general form, and leave for later sections the specific choice of
parameters involved. For the purpose of introducing adaptive diffusion, we specifically on an infinite d-regular tree as the
underlying contact network.
We step through the intuition of the adaptive diffusion spreading model with an example, partially illustrated in Figure 2.
The precise algorithm description is provided in Protocol 1. Adaptive diffusion ensures that the infected subgraph Gt at any
even timestep t ∈ {2, 4, . . .} is a balanced tree of depth t/2, i.e. the hop distance from any leaf to the root (or the center of the
graph) is t/2. We call the root node of Gt the “virtual source” at time t, and denote it by vt. We use v0 = v∗ to denote the
true source. To keep the regular structure at even timesteps, we use the odd timesteps to transition from one regular subtree
Gt to another one Gt+2 with depth incremented by one.
More concretely, the first three steps are always the same. At time t = 0, the rumor source v∗ selects, uniformly at random,
one of its neighbors to be the virtual source v2; at time t = 1, v∗ passes the message to v2. Next at t = 2, the new virtual
source v2 infects all its uninfected neighbors forming G2 (see Figure 2). Then node v2 chooses to either keep the virtual source
token or to pass it along.
If v2 chooses to remain the virtual source i.e., v4 = v2, it passes ‘infection messages’ to all the leaf nodes in the infected
subtree, telling each leaf to infect all its uninfected neighbors. Since the virtual source is not connected to the leaf nodes
in the infected subtree, these infection messages get relayed by the interior nodes of the subtree. This leads to Nt messages
getting passed in total (we assume this happens instantaneously). These messages cause the rumor to spread symmetrically in
all directions at t = 3. At t = 4, no spreading occurs (Figure 2, right panel).
If v2 does not choose to remain the virtual source, it passes the virtual source token to a randomly chosen neighbor v4,
excluding the previous virtual source (in this example, v0). Thus, if the virtual source moves, it moves away from the true
source by one hop. Once v4 receives the virtual source token, it sends out infection messages. However, these messages do not
get passed back in the direction of the previous virtual source. This causes the infection to spread asymmetrically over only
one subtree of the infected graph (G3 in Figure 2, left panel). In the subsequent timestep (t = 4), the virtual source remains
fixed and passes the same infection messages again. After this second round of asymmetric spreading, the infected graph is
once again symmetric about the virtual source v4 (G4 in Figure 2, left panel).
This process continues at each timestep: the virtual source vt chooses whether to keep or pass the virtual source token.
Conditioned on this decision, the infected subgraph grows deterministically as needed to ensure symmetry about the new virtual
source, vt+2.
As we will see momentarily, adaptive diffusion uses varying amounts of control information to coordinate the spread of
messages. In some adversarial models (snapshot), this control information does not hurt anonymity; in others (spy-based), it
can be problematic. We therefore introduce different implementations of adaptive diffusion as needed, using different amounts
of control information. In each implementation, the resulting distribution of the random infection process is the same (if the
same parameters are used).
This random infection process can be defined as a time-inhomogeneous (time-dependent) Markov chain over the state defined
by the location of the current virtual source {vt}t∈{0,2,4,...}. By the symmetry of the underlying contact network, which we
assume is an infinite d-regular tree, and the fact that the next virtual source is chosen uniformly at random among the neighbors
of the current virtual source, it is sufficient to consider a Markov chain over the hop distance between the true source v∗ and
5Algorithm 1 Adaptive Diffusion
Input: contact network G = (V,E), source v∗, time T , degree d
Output: set of infected nodes VT
1: V0 ← {v∗}, h← 0, v0 ← v∗
2: v∗ selects one of its neighbors u at random
3: V1 ← V0 ∪ {u}, h← 1, v1 ← u
4: let N(u) represent u’s neighbors
5: V2 ← V1 ∪N(u) \ {v∗}, v2 ← v1
6: t← 3
7: for t ≤ T do
8: vt−1 selects a random variable X ∼ U(0, 1)
9: if X ≤ αd(t− 1, h) then
10: for all v ∈ N(vt−1) do
11: Infection Message(G,vt−1,v,Gt)
12: else
13: vt−1 randomly selects u ∈ N(vt−1) \ {vt−2}
14: h← h+ 1
15: vt ← u
16: for all v ∈ N(vt) \ {vt−1} do
17: Infection Message(G,vt,v,Vt)
18: if t+ 1 > T then
19: break
20: Infection Message(G,vt,v,Vt)
21: t← t+ 2
22: procedure INFECTION MESSAGE(G,u,v,Vt)
23: if v ∈ Vt then
24: for all w ∈ N(v) \ {u} do
25: Infection Message(G,v,w,Gt)
26: else
27: Vt ← Vt−2 ∪ {v}
vt, the virtual source at time t. Therefore, we design a Markov chain over the state
ht = δH(v
∗, vt) ,
for even t, where δH(v∗, vt) denotes the hop distance between nodes v∗ (the true source) and vt (the virtual source). Figure
2 shows an example with (h2, h4) = (1, 2) on the left and (h2, h4) = (1, 1) on the right.
At every even timestep, the protocol randomly determines whether to keep the virtual source token (ht+2 = ht) or to pass
it (ht+2 = ht + 1). We specify the resulting time-inhomogeneous Markov chain over {ht}t∈{2,4,6,...} by choosing appropriate
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Fig. 2: Adaptive diffusion over regular trees. Yellow nodes indicate the set of virtual sources (past and present), and for T = 4,
the virtual source node is outlined in red.
6transition probabilities as a function of time t and current state ht. For even t, we denote this probability by
αd(t, h) , P
(
ht+2 = ht|ht = h
)
, (1)
where the subscript d denotes the degree of the underlying contact network. In Figure 2, at t = 2, the virtual source remains
at the current node (right) with probability α3(2, 1), or passes the virtual source to a neighbor with probability 1 − α3(2, 1)
(left). The parameters αd(t, h) fully describe the transition probability of the Markov chain defined over ht ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t/2}.
For example, if we choose αd(t, h) = 1 for all t and h, then the virtual source never moves for t > 1. The message spreads
almost symmetrically, so the source can be caught with high probability, much like diffusion. If we instead choose αd(t, h) = 0
for all t and h, the virtual source always moves. This ensures that the source is always at one of the leaves of the infected
subgraph. We return to this special case when addressing spy-based adversaries in Section IV.
The real challenge, then, is choosing the parameters αd(t, h), which fully specify the virtual source transition probabilities.
These parameters can significantly alter the anonymity and spreading properties of adaptive diffusion. In this work, we explain
how to choose this parameter αd to achieve desired source obfuscation.
III. SNAPSHOT-BASED ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Under the snapshot adversarial model, an adversary observes the infected subgraph GT at a certain time T and produces an
estimate vˆ of the source v∗ of the message. Since the adversary is assumed to not have any prior information on which node
is likely to be the source, we analyze the performance of the maximum likelihood estimator
vˆML = arg max
v∈GT
P(GT |v). (2)
We show that adaptive diffusion with appropriate parameters can achieve perfect obfuscation, i.e. the probability of detection
for the ML estimator when n nodes are infected is close to 1/n:
P
(
vˆML = v
∗|NT = n
)
=
1
n
+ o
( 1
n
)
. (3)
This is the best source obfuscation that can be achieved by any protocol, since there are only n candidates for the source and
they are all equally likely.
A. Main Result (Snapshot Model)
In this section, we show that for appropriate choice of parameters αd(t, h), we can achieve both fast spreading and perfect
obfuscation over d-regular trees. We start by giving baseline spreading rates for deterministic spreading and diffusion.
Given a contact network of an infinite d-regular tree, d > 2, consider the following deterministic spreading protocol. At
time t = 1, the source node infects all its neighbors. At t ≥ 2, the nodes at the boundary of the infection spread the message
to their uninfected neighbors. Thus, the message spreads one hop in every direction at each timestep. This approach is the
fastest-possible spreading, infecting NT = 1 + d((d− 1)T − 1)/(d− 2) nodes at time T , but the source is trivially identified
as the center of the infected subtree. In this case, the infected subtree is a balanced regular tree where all leaves are at equal
depth from the source.
Now consider a random diffusion model. At each timestep, each uninfected neighbor of an infected node is independently
infected with probability q. In this case, E[NT ] = 1 + qd((d−1)T −1)/(d−2), and it was shown in [7] that the probability of
correct detection for the maximum likelihood estimator of the rumor source is P(vˆML = v∗) ≥ Cd for some positive constant
Cd that only depends on the degree d. Hence, the source is only hidden in a constant number of nodes close to the center,
even when the total number of infected nodes is arbitrarily large.
Now we consider the spreading and anonymity properties of adaptive diffusion. Let p(t) = [p(t)h ]h∈{1,...,t/2} denote the
distribution of the state of the Markov chain at time t, i.e. p(t)h = P(ht = h). The state transition can be represented as the
following ((t/2) + 1)× (t/2) dimensional column stochastic matrices:
p(t+2) =

αd(t, 1)
1− αd(t, 1) αd(t, 2)
1− αd(t, 2) . . .
. . . αd(t, t/2)
1− αd(t, t/2)
 p
(t).
We treat ht as strictly positive, because at time t = 0, when h0 = 0, the virtual source is always passed. Thus, ht ≥ 1
afterwards. At all even t, we desire p(t) to be
p(t) =
d− 2
(d− 1)t/2 − 1

1
(d− 1)
...
(d− 1)t/2−1
 ∈ Rt/2 , (4)
7for d > 2 and for d = 2, p(t) = (2/t)1t/2 where 1t/2 is all ones vector in Rt/2. There are d(d − 1)h−1 nodes at distance h
from the virtual source, and by symmetry all of them are equally likely to have been the source:
P(GT |v∗, δH(v∗, vt) = h) = 1
d(d− 1)h−1 p
(t)
h
=
d− 2
d((d− 1)t/2 − 1) ,
for d > 2, which is independent of h. Hence, all the infected nodes (except for the virtual source) are equally likely to have
been the source of the origin. This statement is made precise in Equation (7).
Together with the desired probability distribution in Equation (4), this gives a recursion over t and h for computing the
appropriate αd(t, h)’s. After some algebra and an initial state p(2) = 1, we get that the following choice ensures the desired
Equation (4):
αd(t, h) =
{
(d−1)t/2−h+1−1
(d−1)t/2+1−1 if d > 2
t−2h+2
t+2 if d = 2
(5)
With this choice of parameters, we show that adaptive diffusion spreads fast, infecting Nt = O((d − 1)t/2) nodes at time t
and each of the nodes except for the virtual source is equally likely to have been the source.
Theorem 3.1: Suppose the contact network is a d-regular tree with d ≥ 2, and one node v∗ in G starts to spread a message
according to Protocol 1 at time t = 0, with αd(t, h) chosen according to Equation 5. At a certain time T ≥ 0 an adversary
estimates the location of the source v∗ using the maximum likelihood estimator vˆML. The following properties hold for Protocol
1:
(a) the number of infected nodes at time T is
NT ≥
{
2(d−1)(T+1)/2−d
(d−2) + 1 if d > 2
T + 1 if d = 2
(6)
(b) the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood estimator at time T is
P (vˆML = v∗) ≤
{ d−2
2(d−1)(T+1)/2−d if d > 2
(1/T ) if d = 2
(7)
(c) the expected hop-distance between the true source v∗ and its estimate vˆML under maximum likelihood estimation is lower
bounded by
E[d(vˆML, v∗)] ≥ d− 1
d
T
2
. (8)
(Proof in Section VIII-A)
Although this choice of parameters achieves perfect obfuscation, the spreading rate is slower than the deterministic spreading
model, which infects O((d−1)T ) nodes at time T . However, this type of constant-factor loss in the spreading rate is inevitable:
the only way to deviate from the deterministic spreading model is to introduce appropriate delays.
In order to spread according to adaptive diffusion with the prescribed αd(h, t), the system needs to know the degree d
of the underlying contact network. However, performance is insensitive to knowledge of d for certain parameter settings, as
shown in the following proposition. Specifically, one can choose αd(h, t) = 0 for all d, h, and t and still achieve performance
comparable to the optimal choice. The main idea is that there are as many nodes in the boundary of the snapshot (leaf nodes)
as there are in the interior, so it is sufficient to hide among the leaves. One caveat is that if the underlying contact network is a
line (i.e. d = 2) then this approach fails since there are only two leaf nodes at any given time, and the probability of detection
is trivially 1/2.
Proposition 3.2: Suppose that the underlying contact network G is an infinite d-regular tree with d > 2, and one node v∗
in G starts to spread a message at time t = 0 according to Protocol 1 with αd(h, t) = 0 for all d, h, and t. At a certain time
T ≥ 1 an adversary estimates the location of the source v∗ using the maximum likelihood estimator vˆML. Then the following
properties hold:
(a) the number of infected nodes at time T ≥ 1 is at least
NT ≥ (d− 1)
(T+1)/2
d− 2 ; (9)
(b) the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood estimator at time T is
P
(
vˆML = v
∗) = d− 1
2 + (d− 2)NT ; and (10)
8(c) the expected hop-distance between the true source v∗ and its estimate vˆ is lower bounded by
E[δH(v∗, vˆML)] ≥ T
2
. (11)
(Proof in Section VIII-B).
Multiple snapshots. The results in Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 hold for a single snapshot. However, an adversary could
in principle take multiple snapshots of the same message’s spread, at different points in time. We show that doing so increases
the probability of detection at most by a logarithmic factor, compared to what it learns from the first snapshot (on average).
Proposition 3.3: Suppose that the underlying contact network G is an infinite d-regular tree with d > 2, and one node v∗
in G starts to spread a message at time t = 0 according to Protocol 1, with αd(t, h) chosen according to Equation 5. At a
certain time T ≥ 0 an adversary observes a snapshot GT with NT nodes. In timesteps {T1, T2, . . . , Tm}, where Ti > T for
all i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}, the adversary again observes snapshots GTi . The adversary then estimates the location of the source v∗
using a maximum likelihood estimator vˆML, based on knowledge of all observed snapshots. Then the probability of source
detection for the maximum likelihood estimator at time T is upper bounded as follows:
P
(
vˆML = v
∗) ≤ C logd−1NT
NT − 1 + o
(
logd−1NT
NT
)
(12)
where the constant C depends only only on the tree degree d.
(Proof in Section VIII-C).
This result suggests that an adversary cannot learn much more than the information it learns from the first snapshot; i.e.,
the probability of detection increases at most from O(1/NT ) to O(logNT /NT ). Moving forward, we will assume that the
snapshot adversary observes only one snapshot, at time T .
B. Irregular Trees
In this section, we study adaptive diffusion on irregular trees, with potentially different degrees at the vertices. Although the
degrees are irregular, we still apply adaptive diffusion with αd0(t, h)’s chosen for a specific d0 that might be mismatched with
the graph due to degree irregularities. There are a few challenges in this degree-mismatched adaptive diffusion. First, finding
the maximum likelihood estimate of the source is not immediate, due to degree irregularities. Second, it is not clear a priori
which choice of d0 is good. We first show an efficient message-passing algorithm for computing the maximum likelihood
source estimate. Using this estimate, we illustrate through simulations how adaptive diffusion performs and show that the
detection probability is not too sensitive to the choice of d0 as long as d0 is above a threshold that depends on the degree
distribution.
Then, for the special choice of d0 = ∞, we precisely characterize the maximum likelihood probability of detection and
demonstrate that adaptive diffusion does not provide perfect obfuscation. Doing so requires proving a concentration result
for an extreme value defined over Galton-Watson branching processes, which may be of independent interest. We use the
associated analysis to propose a modification of adaptive diffusion called preferential-attachment adaptive diffusion (PAAD),
which empirically improves the probability of detection over irregular trees, compared to standard adaptive diffusion.
Efficient ML estimation. To keep the discussion simple, we assume that T is even. The same approach can be naturally extended
to odd T . Since the spreading pattern in adaptive diffusion is entirely deterministic given the sequence of virtual sources at each
timestep, computing the likelihood P(GT |v∗ = v) is equivalent to computing the probability of the virtual source moving from v
to vT over T timesteps. On trees, there is only one path from v to vT and since we do not allow the virtual source to “backtrack",
we only need to compute the probability of every virtual source sequence (v0, v2, . . . , vT ) that meets the constraint v0 = v.
Due to the Markov property exhibited by adaptive diffusion, we have P(GT |{(vt, ht)}t∈{2,4,...,T}) =
∏
t<T−1
t even
P(vt+2|vt, ht),
where ht = δH(v0, vt). For t even, P(vt+2|vt, ht) = αd(t, ht) if vt = vt+2 and 1−αd(t,ht)dvt−1 otherwise. Here dvt denotes the
degree of node vt in G. Given a virtual source trajectory P = (v0, v2, . . . , vT ), let JP = (j1, . . . , jδH(v0,vT )) denote the
timesteps at which a new virtual source is introduced, with 1 ≤ ji ≤ T . It always holds that j1 = 2 because after t = 0, the
true source chooses a new virtual source and v2 6= v0. If the virtual source at t = 2 were to keep the token exactly once after
receiving it (so v2 = v4), then j2 = 6, and so forth. To find the likelihood of a node being the true source, we sum over all
such trajectories
P(GT |v0) =
∑
JP :P∈S(v0,vT ,T )
1
dv0
δH (v0,vT )−1∏
k=1
1
dvjk − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Av0
×
∏
t<T
t even
(
1{t+2/∈JP}αd(t, ht) + 1{t+2∈JP}(1− αd(t, ht))
)
,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bv0
(13)
9where 1 is the indicator function and
S(v0, vT , T ) = {P : P = (v0, v2, . . . , vT ) is a valid trajectory of the virtual source}. Intuitively, part Av0 of the above
expression is the probability of choosing the set of virtual sources specified by P , and part Bv0 is the probability of keeping
or passing the virtual source token at the specified timesteps. Equation (13) holds for both regular and irregular trees. Since
the path between two nodes in a tree is unique, and part Av0 is (approximately) the product of node degrees in that path, Av0
is identical for all trajectories P . Pulling Av0 out of the summation, we wish to compute the summation over all valid paths
P of part Bv0 (for ease of exposition, we will use Bv0 to refer to this whole summation). Although there are combinatorially
many valid paths, we can simplify the formula in Equation (13) for the particular choice of αd(t, h)’s defined in (5).
Proposition 3.4: Suppose that the underlying contact network G˜ is an infinite tree with degree of each node larger than one.
One node v˜∗ in G˜ starts to spread a message at time t = 0 according to Protocol 1 with the choice of d = d0. At a certain
even time T ≥ 0, the maximum likelihood estimate of v˜∗ given a snapshot of the infected subtree G˜T is
arg max
v∈G˜T \v˜T
d0
dv
∏
v′∈P (v˜T ,v)\{v˜T ,v}
d0 − 1
dv′ − 1 (14)
where v˜T is the (Jordan) center of the infected subtree G˜T , P (v˜T , v) is the unique shortest path from v˜T to v, and dv′ is the
degree of node v′.
To understand this proposition, consider Figure 3, which was spread using adaptive diffusion (Protocol 1) with a choice
of d0 = 2. Then Equation (14) can be computed easily for each node, giving [1/2, 1, 0, 1, 2/3, 1/2, 1/2, 1/4] for nodes
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], respectively. Hence, nodes 2 and 4 are most likely. Intuitively, nodes whose path to the center have small de-
grees are more likely. However, if we repeat this estimation assuming d0 = 4, then Equation (14) gives [3, 2, 0, 2, 4/3, 3, 3, 3/2].
In this case, nodes 1, 6, and 7 are most likely. When d0 is large, adaptive diffusion tends to place the source closer to the
leaves of the infected subtree, so leaf nodes are more likely to have been the source.
4v
1 2 3
4
5
6
7
8
Fig. 3: Irregular tree G˜4 with virtual source v˜4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: We first make two observations: (a) Over regular trees, P(GT |u) = P(GT |w) for any u 6= w ∈
GT , even if they are different distances from the virtual souce. (b) Part Bv0 is identical for regular and irregular graphs, as
long as the distance from the candidate source node to vT is the same in both, and the same d0 is used to compute αd0(t, h).
That is, let G˜T denote an infected subtree over an irregular tree network, with virtual source v˜T , and GT will denote a regular
infected subtree with virtual source vT . For candidate sources v˜0 ∈ G˜T and v0 ∈ GT , if δH(v˜T , v˜0) = δH(vT , v0) = h, then
Bv0 = Bv˜0 . So to find the likelihood of v˜0 ∈ G˜T , we can solve for Bv˜0 using the likelihood of v0 ∈ GT , and compute Av˜0
using the degree information of every node in the infected, irregular subgraph.
To solve for Bv˜0 , note that over regular graphs, Av = 1/(d0 (d0 − 1)δH(v,vT )−1), where d0 is the degree of the regular
graph. If G is a regular tree, Equation (13) still applies. Critically, for regular trees, the αd0(t, h)’s are designed such that the
likelihood of each node being the true source is equal. Hence,
P(GT |v0) = 1
d0(d0 − 1)δH(v0,vT )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Av0
×Bv0 , (15)
is a constant that does not depend on v0. This gives Bv0 ∝ (d0 − 1)δH(vT ,v0). From observation (b), we have that Bv˜0 = Bv0 .
Thus we get that for a v˜0 ∈ G˜T \ {v˜T },
P(G˜T |v˜0) = Av˜0 Bv˜0
∝ (d0 − 1)
δH(v˜T ,v˜0)
dv˜0
∏
v˜′∈P (v˜T ,v˜0)\{v˜0,v˜T }(dv˜′ − 1)
After scaling appropriately and noting that |P (v˜T , v˜0)| = δH(v˜T , v˜0) + 1, this gives the formula in Equation (14).
We provide an efficient message passing algorithm for computing the ML estimate in Equation (14), which is naturally
distributed. We then use this estimator to simulate message spreading for random irregular trees and show that when d0
exceeds a threshold (determined by the degree distribution), obfuscation is not too sensitive to the choice of d0.
Av˜0 can be computed efficiently for irregular graphs with a simple message-passing algorithm. In this algorithm, each node
v˜ multiplies its degree information by a cumulative likelihood that gets passed from the virtual source to the leaves. Thus
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Algorithm 2 Implementation of ML estimator in (14)
Input: infected network G˜T = (V˜T , E˜T ), virtual source v˜T , time T , the spreading model parameter d0
Output: argmaxv˜∈V˜T P(G˜T |v˜∗ = v˜)
1: Pv˜ , P(G˜T |v˜∗ = v˜).
2: Pv˜T ← 0
3: Av˜ ← 1 for v˜ ∈ V˜T \ {v˜T }
4: Av˜T ← 0
5: A← Degree Message(GT , v˜T , v˜T , A)
6: P(GT |vleaf )← 1d0(d0−1)T/2−1
∏
t<T
t even
(1− αd0(t, t2 ))}
7: for all v˜ ∈ V˜T \ {v˜T } do
8: h← δH(v˜, v˜T )
9: Bv˜ ← P(GT |vleaf ) · d0 · (d0 − 1)h−1
10: Pv˜ ← Av˜ ·Bv˜
return argmaxv˜∈V˜TPv˜
11: procedure DEGREE MESSAGE(G˜T , u˜, v˜, A)
12: for all w˜ ∈ N(v˜) \ {u˜} do
13: if v˜ = u˜ then
14: Aw˜ ← Av˜/dw˜
15: Degree Message(G˜T , v˜, w˜, A)
16: else
17: if v˜ is not a leaf then
18: Aw˜ ← Av˜ · dv˜/(dw˜ · (dv˜ − 1))
19: Degree Message(G˜T , v˜, w˜, A)
return A
if there are N˜T infected nodes in G˜T , then Av˜0 for every v˜0 ∈ G˜T can be computed by passing O(N˜T ) messages. This
message-passing is outlined in procedure ‘Degree Message’ of Algorithm 2. For example, consider computing A5 for the
graph in Figure 3. The virtual source v˜T = 3 starts by setting A2 = 12 , A4 =
1
2 , and A5 =
1
3 . This gives A5, but to compute
other other values of Aw˜, the message passing continues. Each of the nodes v˜ ∈ N(3) in turn sets Aw˜ for their children
w˜ ∈ N(v˜); this is done by dividing Av˜ by dw˜ and replacing the factor of 1dv˜ in Av˜ with 1dv˜−1 . For example, node 5 would
set A7 = A52 · 32 . This step is applied recursively until reaching the leaves.
As discussed earlier, Bv˜0 only depends on d0 and δH(v˜T , v˜0). If vleaf ∈ GT is a leaf node and G is a regular tree, we get
P(GT |vleaf) = 1
d0(d0 − 1)T/2−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Avleaf
∏
t<T
t even
(1− αd0(t,
t
2
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bvleaf
. (16)
If v˜0 is h < T/2 hops from v˜T , then for node v0 with δH(v0, vT ) = h < T/2 over a regular tree,
P(GT |v0) = P(GT |vleaf) = 1
d0 · (d0 − 1)h−1Bv0 .
Finally, Bv˜0 = Bv0 . So to solve for B5 in our example, we compute P(GT |vleaf ) for a 3-regular graph at time T = 4. This gives
P(G4|vleaf ) = Avleaf ·Bvleaf = 16 · (1−α3(2, 1)) = 19 . Thus B5 = P(G4|vleaf ) ·d0 · (d0−1)h−1 = P(G4|vleaf ) ·3 · (2)0 = 13 .
This gives P(G˜4|5) = A5 ·B5 = 19 . The same can be done for other nodes in the graph to find the maximum likelihood source
estimate.
Simulation studies. We tested adaptive diffusion over random trees in which each node’s degree was drawn i.i.d. from a fixed
distribution. Figure 4 illustrates simulation results for random trees in which each node has degree 3 or 4 with equal probability,
averaged over 100,000 trials. By the law of large numbers, the number of nodes infected scales as NT ∼ E[D−1]T/2 = 2.5T/2,
where D represents the degree distribution of the underlying random irregular tree. The value of d0 corresponds to a regular
tree with size scaling as (d0 − 1)T/2. Hence, one can expect that for d0 − 1 < 2.5, the source is likely to be in the center of
the infection, and for d0 > 2.45 the source is likely to be at the boundary of the infection. Since the number of nodes in the
boundary is exponentially larger than the number of nodes in the center, the detection probability is lower for d0 − 1 > 2.5.
This is illustrated in Figure 4, which matches our prediction. In general, choosing d0 = 1 + dE[D − 1]e provides the best
obfuscation, and it is robust for values above that. In this plot, data points represent successive even timesteps; their uniform
spacing on the (log-scale) horizontal axis implies the message is spreading exponentially quickly.
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Fig. 4: The probability of detection by the maximum likelihood estimator depends on the assumed degree d0; the source cannot
hide well below a threshold value of d0.
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Fig. 5: Adaptive diffusion no longer provides perfect obfuscation for highly irregular graphs.
Figure 5 illustrates the probability of detection as a function of infection size while varying the degree distribution of the
underlying tree. The notation (3, 5) => (0.5, 0.5) in the legend indicates that each node in the tree has degree 3 or 5, each with
probability 0.5. For each distribution tested, we chose d0 to be the maximum degree of each degree distribution. The average
size of infection scales as NT ∼ E[D− 1]T as expected, whereas the probability of detection scales as (dmin − 1)−T = 2−T ,
which is independent of the degree distribution. This suggests that adaptive diffusion fails to provide near-perfect obfuscation
when the underlying graph is irregular, and the gap increases with the irregularity of the graph. In the next section, we quantify
this gap, and gain intuition about how to reduce it.
Probability of detection. In this section, we provide the probability of detection for adaptive diffusion over trees whose node
degrees are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution D, for d0 = ∞. However, we cannot exactly use the ML estimator from
Equation 14, which assumes the infinite irregular tree G is given, and the source v∗ is chosen randomly from the nodes of G.
Equation 14 is the correct ML estimator in any practical scenario, but analyzing the probability of detection under this model
requires a prior on the (infinitely many) nodes of G. We therefore consider a closely-related random process, in which we fix
a source v∗ and generate G (and consequently, GT ) on-the-fly. Specifically, at time t = 0, v∗ draws a degree dv∗ from D, and
generates dv∗ child nodes. The source picks one of these neighbors uniformly at random to be the new virtual source. Each time
a node v is infected according to Protocol 1, v draws its degree dv from D, then generates dv−1 child nodes. For example, as
soon as v2, neighbor of v∗, receives the virtual source token, it draws its degree from D and generates dv2 − 1 children. The
structure of the underlying, infinite contact network G is independent of GT conditioned on the uninfected neighbors of the
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leaves of GT , and need not be considered. The adversary observes GT , which is an unlabeled snapshot including GT and its
uninfected neighbors. We have that P(vˆMAP = v∗|T ) =
∑
GT P(GT |T )P(vˆMAP = v∗|GT ). We first consider P(vˆML = v∗|GT ).
1) Probability of Detection Given a Snapshot: The adversary observes this random process at time T (i.e., it observes GT ,
knowing that the interior GT are the infected nodes), and estimates one of the leaf node as an estimate of the true source
which started the random process. The following theorem analyzes the probability of detecting the true source for any estimate
vˆ, given a snapshot GT .
Theorem 3.5: Under the above described random process of adaptive diffusion, an adversary observes the snapshot GT at
an even time T > 0 and estimates vˆ ∈ ∂GT . For any estimator vˆ, the conditional probability of detection is
P(vˆ = v∗|GT ) = 1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(vˆ,vT )
\{vT ,vˆ}
1
(dw − 1) , (17)
where vT is the center of GT , φ(vˆ, vT ) is the (unique) path from vˆ to vT , GT is the interior of GT which is the infected
sub-tree, and ∂GT is the set of leaves of GT .
A proof is provided in Section VIII-D. Intuitively, Equation (17) is the probability that the virtual source starting from vˆ
ends up at vT (up to some constant factor for normalization). This gives a simple rule for the adversary to achieve the best
detection probability by computing the MAP estimate:
vˆ
(T )
MAP ∈ arg max
vˆ
P(vˆ(T ) = v∗|GT ) . (18)
Corollary 3.6: Under the hypotheses of Theorem 3.5, the MAP estimator in (18) can be computed as
vˆ
(T )
MAP = arg min
v∈∂GT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{vT ,v}
(dw − 1) , (19)
achieving a conditional probability of detection
P(vˆ(T )MAP = v
∗|GT ) = max
v∈∂GT
1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{vT ,v}
(dw − 1) . (20)
When applied to regular trees, this recovers known results of [42], which confirms that adaptive diffusion provides strong
anonymity guarantees under d-regular trees. But more importantly, Corollary 3.6 characterizes how the anonymity guarantee
depends on the general topology of the snapshot. We illustrate this in two extreme examples: a regular tree and an extreme
example in Figure 6.
For a d-regular tree, where all nodes have the same degree, the size of infection at even time T is the number of nodes in
a d-regular tree of depth T/2:
NT =
d(d− 1)T/2
d− 2 +
2
d− 2 . (21)
To achieve a perfect obfuscation, we want the probability of detection to decay as 1/NT . We can apply Corollary 3.6 to this
d-regular tree and show the probability of detection is ((d−1)/d)(d−1)−T/2), which recovers one of the known results in [42,
Proposition 2.2]. This confirms that adaptive diffusion achieves near-perfect obfuscation, up to a small factor of (d−1)/(d−2).
On the other hand, when there exists a path to a leaf node consisting of low-degree nodes, adaptive diffusion can be sub-
optimal, and the gap to optimality can be made arbitrarily large. Figure 6 illustrates such an example. This is a tree where
all nodes have the same degree d = 5, except for those nodes along the path from the center vT to a leaf node v, including
vT and excluding v. The center vT has degree two and the nodes in the path have degree three. Hence, the shaded triangles
indicate d-regular sub-trees of appropriate heights. The size of this infection is NT = ((d − 1)T/2+1/(d − 2)2)(1 + o(1)).
Ideally, one might hope to achieve a probability of detection that scales as 1/(d− 1)T/2. However, Corollary 3.6 shows that
the adaptive diffusion achieves probability of detection 1/2T/2, with the leaf node v achieving this maximum in Equation (20).
Hence, there is a multiplicative gap of ((d − 1)/2)T/2. By increasing d, the gap can be made arbitrarily large. On the other
hand, such an extreme topology is rare under the i.i.d tree model.
2) Concentration of Probability of Detection: Depending on the topology, adaptive diffusion can be significantly sub-
optimal. A natural question is “what is the typical topology of a graph resulting from the random tree model?” Under the
model introduced previously, we give a concrete answer. Perhaps surprisingly, this typical topology can be characterized by
solving a simple convex optimization.
We are interested in the following extremal value
ΛGT ≡ dvT min
v∈∂GT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{vT ,v}
(dw − 1) , (22)
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Fig. 6: An example of a snapshot emphasizing the sub-optimality of adaptive diffusion.
which captures the topology of the snapshot. We want to characterize the typical value of this function over random tree GT
resulting from the adaptive diffusion process.
Observe that the distribution of the balanced tree GT follows a simple branching process known as Galton-Watson process.
This is because GT resulting from adaptive diffusion has the same distribution, independent of the location of the source v∗. We
consider a given degree distribution D. We use D to denote both a random variable and its distribution—the distinction should
be clear from context. The random variable D has support f = (f1, . . . , fη) associated with probability p = (p1, . . . , pη) such
that the degree of node v is i.i.d. with
dv =

f1 with probability p1 ,
...
...
fη with probability pη ,
(23)
where 2 < f1 < f2 < · · · < fη are integers and the positive pi’s sum to one. We also assume D’s support set has at least two
elements, i.e., η ≥ 2.
Note that the adaptive diffusion always passes the virtual source token to a uniformly-chosen neighbor. It is straightforward
to show that adaptive diffusion starting from a leaf node v∗ has the same distribution over graphs as the following branching
process, denoted GT : at time T = 0 a root node, which we denote as the virtual source vT , creates D offspring. At each
subsequent even time step, each leaf node in GT creates new offspring independently according to D− 1 (where we subtract
one because each leaf is already connected to its parent). This process is repeated until time step T , which generates a random
tree GT . More precisely, the two branching processes are equal in distribution: GT
D
=GT . This can be seen by observing that
conditioned on the path of nodes φ(v∗, vT ), the branching processes are identical. Since the node degrees in this path are
drawn independently, the path is equally distributed whether it starts from the virtual source vT or the leaf node v∗.
The following theorem provides a concentration inequality on the extremal quantity ΛGT , which in turn determines the
probability of detection as provided by Corollary 3.6:
P(vˆ(T )MAP = v
∗|GT ) = 1
ΛGT
. (24)
Theorem 3.7: For an even T > 0, suppose a random tree GT is generated from the root vT according to the Galton-Watson
process with i.i.d. degree distribution D, where f and p are defined as in (23), then the following results hold:
(a) If p1(f1 − 1) > 1, for any positive δ > 0, there exists positive constants CD,δ and C ′D,δ that depend only on the degree
distribution and the choice of δ such that
P
(∣∣∣∣ log(ΛGT )T/2 − log(f1 − 1)
∣∣∣∣ > δ) ≤ e−CD,δT , (25)
for an even time T ≥ C ′D,δ .
(b) If p1(f1 − 1) < 1, define the mean number of children:
µD ≡
η∑
i=1
pi(fi − 1) ,
and the set
RD =
{
r ∈ Sη | log(µD) ≥ DKL(r‖β)
}
, (26)
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where Sη denotes the η-dimensional probability simplex, DKL(·‖·) denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence, and β is a
length-η probability vector in which βi = pi(fi − 1)/µD. Further, define r∗ as follows:
r∗ = arg min
r∈RD
〈
r , log(f − 1) 〉 , (27)
where 〈r, log(f − 1)〉 = ∑ηi=1 ri log (fi − 1). Then for any δ > 0, there exists positive constants CD,δ and C ′D,δ that
only depend on the degree distribution D and the choice of δ > 0 such that
P
(∣∣∣∣ log(ΛGT )T/2 − 〈r∗, log(f − 1)〉
∣∣∣∣ > δ) ≤ e−CD′,δT (28)
for an even time T ≥ C ′D,δ .
The results in parts (a) and (b) can be merged, in the sense that the solution of (27) is r∗ = [1, 0, . . . , 0] when p1(f1−1) > 1.
A proof of this theorem is provided in Section VIII-E. Putting it together with (24), it follows that the probability of detection
concentrates around
− 2
T
log
(
P(vˆ(T )MAP = v
∗)
) ' 〈r∗ , log(f − 1)〉 ,
in case (b) and around log(f1 − 1) in case (a). Here ' indicates concentration for large enough T . We want to emphasize
that r∗ can be computed using off-the-shelf optimization tools, since the program in (27) is a convex program of dimension
η. This follows from the fact that the objective is linear in r and the feasible region is convex since KL divergence is convex
in r.
For example, if D is 3 w.p. 0.7 or 4 w.p. 0.3, then this falls under case (a). The theorem predicts the probability of detection
to decay as (3− 1)−T/2. On the other hand, if
D =
{
2 with probability 0.3
3 with probability 0.7 ,
then this falls under case (b) with µD = 1.7, β1 = 0.3/1.7, and β2 = 1.4/1.7. In this case, the exponent is a solution of the
following optimization for r = [r, 1− r]:
minimize
r∈R
r log 1 + (1− r) log 2
subject to r log
1.7r
0.3
+ (1− r) log 1.7(1− r)
1.4
≤ log(1.7)
r ∈ [0, 1]
It follows that the optimal solution is r∗ ' [0.64, 0.36] and the probability of detection decays as 2−0.36(T/2). Figure 7
confirms this prediction with simulations for these examples.
Theorem 3.7 provides a simple convex program that computes the probability of detection for any degree distribution. For
random trees, this quantifies the gap between what adaptive diffusion can guarantee and the perfect obfuscation one desires.
We define the rescaled log-multiplicative gap as
∆D ≡ 2
T
log
P(v(T )MAP = v∗)
1/E[|∂GT |] ,
where |∂GT | is the total number of candidates in a snapshot. It is not difficult to show that E[|∂GT |] = µT/2D , and it follows
that ∆D ' logµD −〈r∗, log(f − 1)〉. For example, ∆D = 0 for regular trees, and ∆D = log2 2.3− log2 2 = 0.20 for the first
example under case (a) and ∆D = log2 1.7− 0.36 = 0.41 for the second example under case (b).
Simulation studies. Figure 7 empirically checks the predictions in Theorems 3.5 and 3.7. The distribution with support
f = (3, 4) with probabilities p = (0.5, 0.5) addresses case 1 from the theorem, where p1(f1 − 1) > 1. The distribution with
support f = (2, 3) with probabilities p = (0.3, 0.7) addresses case 2, where p1(f1 − 1) < 1. In both examples, we observe
that the empirical log(P(vˆ = v∗))/(T/2) converges to the theoretical value predicted in Figure 7. However, this convergence
may be slow, and the timestep duration of these experiments was limited by computational considerations since the graph size
grows exponentially in time.
3) Preferential Attachment : Our analysis reveals that adaptive diffusion can be significantly sub-optimal, when the under-
lying graph degrees are highly irregular. To bridge this gap, we introduce a family of protocols we call Preferential Attachment
Adaptive Diffusion (PAAD). We analyze the performance of PAAD and provide numerical simulations showing that PAAD
improves over adaptive diffusion when degrees are irregular.
The reason for this gap is that in typical random trees, there are nodes that are significantly more likely to be the source,
compared to other typical candidate nodes. To achieve near-perfect obfuscation, we want all candidate nodes to have similar
posterior probabilities of being the source. To balance the posterior probabilities of leaf nodes, we suggest passing the virtual
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Fig. 7: Empirical verification of Theorems 3.5 and 3.7. We observe that the probability of detection converges in time to the
predicted values, which depend only on the underlying degree distribution.
source with higher probability to high-degree nodes. We propose a family of protocols based on this idea, and make this
intuition precise in Theorem 3.8.
PAAD is based on adaptive diffusion, but we modify how virtual sources are chosen. We parametrize this family of protocols
by a non-negative integer g. When a new virtual source is to be chosen, instead of choosing uniformly among its neighbors
(except for the previous virtual source), the new virtual source is selected with probability weighted by the size of its g-hop
neighborhood. Let Ng(v) denote the set of g-hop neighbors of node v, and let Ng(v, w) denote the same set, removing any
nodes z for which w ∈ φ(z, v), where φ(z, v) denotes the path between z and v. Then for instance, if g = 1, then each time
the virtual source is passed from vT to vT+2, it is passed to a neighbor w ∈ N1(vT , vT−2) with probability proportional to
dw − 1:
P(vT+2 = w) =
dw − 1∑
w′∈N1(vT ,vT−2)(dw′ − 1)
.
For general g, the probability is proportional to the size of the candidate w’s g-hop local neighborhood, excluding those in
the direction of the current virtual source vT . Each virtual source vT chooses the next virtual source as follows: for any node
w ∈ N1(vT , vT−2),
P (vT+2 = w) =
|Ng(w, vT )|∑
w′∈N1(vT ,vT−2) |Ng(w′, vT )|
.
PAAD encourages the virtual source to traverse high-degree nodes. This balances the posterior probabilities, by strengthening
the probability of leaf nodes whose path contain high-degree nodes, while weakening those with low-degree nodes.
This intuition is made precise in the following theorem, which analyzes the probability of detection for a given snapshot.
Define the probability that the sequence of decisions on choosing the virtual sources results in the path from a source v to the
current virtual source vT as Q(GT , v) ≡
∏T/2
t=1 P(v2t = wt) , where
φ(v, vT ) = (w0 = v, w1, w2, . . . , wT/2−1, wT/2 = vT ). The specific probability depends on the choice of g and the topology
of the underlying tree. Note that the progression of the virtual source now depends on g-hop neighborhood, and we therefore
define GT to include the current infected subgraph GT and its (g + 1)-hop neighborhood.
Theorem 3.8: Suppose a node v∗ starts to spread a message at time t = 0 according to PAAD, where the underlying irregular
tree is generated according to the random branching process described in Section III-B. At a certain even time T ≥ 0, an
adversary observes the snapshot of the infected subtree GT and computes a MAP estimate of the source v∗. Then, the following
results hold:
(a) The MAP estimator is
vˆMAP = arg max
v∈∂GT
dv Q(GT , v) (29)
where ∂GT denotes the leaves of GT .
(b) The conditional probability of detection achieved by the MAP estimator is
P(vˆMAP = v∗|GT ) = maxv∈∂GT dv Q(GT , v)∑
w∈∂GT dwQ(GT , w)
(30)
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Fig. 9: Ratio of observed probability of detection to lower-bound probability of detection, for a range of degree distributions.
PAAD has better anonymity properties than regular adaptive diffusion over random, irregular trees.
The proof relies on the techniques developed for Theorem 3.5, and is omitted due to space limitation. The example from
Figure 6 illustrates the power of PAAD. For this class of snapshots, it is straightforward to show that under adaptive diffusion,
PADD = 2
−T/2, whereas under 1-hop PAAD,
PPAADD ≤
2
(d− 1)T/2−1 − 1
.
Notice from these expressions that PPAADD scales as (d−1)−T/2, which achieves perfect obfuscation, whereas regular adaptive
diffusion scales as 2−T/2.
This shows that there exist snapshots where PAAD significantly improves over adaptive diffusion. However, such examples
are rare under the random tree model, and there are also examples of snapshots where adaptive diffusion can achieve a better
obfuscation than PAAD. To complete the analysis, we would like to show the analog of Theorem 3.7 for PAAD. However, the
observed snapshot is no longer generated by a standard Galton-Watson branching process, due to the preferential attachment.
The analysis techniques developed for Theorem 3.7 do not generalize, and new techniques seem to be needed for a technical
analysis. This is outside the scope of this manuscript, but we show simulations suggesting that PAAD improves over adaptive
diffusion.
Simulation studies. PAAD requires each virtual source to know some information about its local neighborhood on the contact
network; in exchange, we observe empirically that it hides the source better than traditional adaptive diffusion. Figure 8 shows
the probability of detection over graphs with a degree distribution of support f = (2, 5) with probability p = (0.5, 0.5). The
results are averaged over 10,000 realizations of the random graph and the spreading sequence. This plot shows empirically that
preferential attachment adaptive diffusion exhibits better hiding properties than regular adaptive diffusion, and that the benefit
of preferential attachment increases with the size of the neighborhood considered for preferential attachment (e.g., one-hop vs.
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two-hop). Notice that our lower bound on probability of detection is 1/|∂GT | rather than 1/NT , as in [42]; this is because we
constrain the source to always be at one of the leaves of the graph, so 1/|∂GT | lower bounds the probability of detection.
Figure 9 computes the ratio of the observed probability of detection to a lower bound on the probability of detection (i.e.,
1/|∂GT |), for both adaptive diffusion (AD) and one-hop PAAD. Empirically, we observe that the advantage of PAAD is greater
when the degree distribution is more imbalanced (i.e., when fmax − fmin is large).
C. General Graphs
In this section, we demonstrate how adaptive diffusion fares over graphs that involve cycles, irregular degrees, and finite
graph size. We provide theoretical guarantees for the special case of two-dimensional grid graphs, and we show simulated
results over a social graph dataset.
1) Grid graphs: Here, we derive the optimal parameters α(t, h) for spreading with adaptive diffusion over an infinite grid
graph, defined as the graph Cartesian product of two infinite line graphs. This example highlights challenges associated with
spreading over cyclic graphs, while still providing a regular, symmetric structure. To spread over grids, we make some changes
to the adaptive diffusion protocol, outlined in Protocol 5 (grid adaptive diffusion).
First, standard adaptive diffusion requires the virtual source to know its distance from the true source. Over trees, this
information was transmitted by passing a distance counter, ht, that was incremented each time the virtual source changed; since
the network was a tree, this distance from the source was non-decreasing as long as the virtual source was non-backtracking.
However, on a cyclic graph (e.g., a grid), the virtual source’s non-backtracking random walk could actually cause its distance
from the true source to decrease with time. We wish to avoid this to preserve adaptive diffusion’s anonymity guarantees.
Therefore, instead of passing the raw hop distance ht to each new virtual source, grid adaptive diffusion passes directional
coordinates (hHt , h
V
t ) detailing the virtual source’s horizontal and vertical displacement from the source, respectively. For
example, in Figure 10, the virtual source v4 would receive parameters (hHt , h
V
t ) = (−1, 1) because it is one hop west and
one hop north of the true source. This indexing assumes some notion of directionality over the underlying contact network;
nodes should know whether they received a message from the north, south, east, or west. If a virtual source chooses to move,
it always passes the token to a node that is further away from the true source, i.e. |hHt+1|+ |hVt+1| ≥ |hHt |+ |hVt |.
To maintain symmetry about the virtual source, we also modify the message-passing algorithm. Just as in adaptive diffusion
over trees, when a new virtual source sends out branching messages, it sends them in every direction except that of the old
virtual source. However, unlike adaptive diffusion over trees, each branch message has up to two “forbidden" directions: the
direction of the previous virtual source, and the direction of the node that originated the branching message (these might be
the same). Thus, if a branch message is sent west, and the previous virtual source was south of the current virtual source,
each node would only propagate the message west and/or north. Whenever a node receives a branch message and its neighbors
are not all infected, it infects all uninfected neighbors. As in adaptive diffusion over trees, two waves of directional branching
messages are sent each time the virtual source moves, in every direction except that of the old virtual source. If the virtual
source instead chooses to stay fixed, then the same rules hold, except the new virtual source only sends one wave of branch
messages, symmetrically in every direction.
Given the spreading protocol, we can choose α(t, h) to give optimal hiding:
α(t, h) =
t− 2(h− 1)
t+ 4
. (31)
Under these conditions, the following result shows that we achieve perfect obfuscation, i.e. P(vˆML = v∗) = 1/NT + o(1/NT ).
Proposition 3.9: Suppose the contact network is an infinite grid, and one node v∗ in G starts to spread a message according
to Protocol 5 (grid adaptive diffusion) at time t = 0, with α(t, h) chosen according to Equation (31). At a certain time T ≥ 0
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an adversary estimates the location of the source v∗ using the maximum likelihood estimator vˆML. The following properties
hold for Protocol 5:
(a) the number of infected nodes at time T is
NT ≥ (T + 1)
2
2
(32)
(b) the probability of source detection for the maximum likelihood estimator at time T is
P (vˆML = v∗) ≤ 2
(T + 3)(T − 1) . (33)
(Proof in Section VIII-F)
The baseline infection rate for deterministic, symmetric spreading is NT = T 2 + (T + 1)2. Grid adaptive diffusion infection
rate is within a constant factor of this maximum possible rate, and it achieves perfect obfuscation over grid graphs. The price
to pay for this non-tree graph is that (a) a significant amount of metadata needs to be transmitted to coordinate the spread—
particularly with respect to the directionality of messages; and (b) the position of the nodes w.r.t. a global reference needs
to be known. Hence, the current implementation of the grid adaptive diffusion has a limited scope, and it remains an open
question how to avoid such requirements for grids and still achieve a perfect obfuscation.
2) Real-world social graphs: In this section, we provide simulation results from running adaptive diffusion over an underlying
connectivity network of 10,000 Facebook users, as described by the Facebook WOSN dataset [43]. We eliminated all nodes
with fewer than three friends (this approach is taken by several existing anonymous applications so users cannot guess which
of their friends originated the message), which left us with a network of 9,502 users.
Over this underlying network, we selected a node uniformly at random as the rumor source, and spread the message using
adaptive diffusion for trees. We did not use grid adaptive diffusion because Protocol 5 assumes the underlying graph has a
symmetric structure with a global notion of directionality, whereas the tree-based adaptive diffusion makes no such assumptions.
We set d0 = ∞, which means that the virtual source is always passed to a new node (i.e., αd(t, h) = 0). This choice is to
make the ML source estimation faster; other choices of d0 may outperform this naive choice. To preserve the symmetry of
our constructed trees as much as possible, we constrained each infected node to infect a maximum of three other nodes in
each timestep. We also give the adversary access to the undirected infection subtree that explicitly identifies all pairs of nodes
for which one node spread the infection to the other. This subtree is overlaid on the underlying contact network, which is not
necessarily tree-structured. We demonstrate in simulation (Figure 11) that even with this strong side information, the adversary
can only identify the true message source with low probability.
Using the naive method of enumerating every possible message trajectory, it is computationally expensive to find the exact
ML source estimate since there are 2T possible trajectories, depending on whether the virtual source stayed or moved at each
timestep. If the true source is one of the leaves, we can closely approximate the ML estimate among all leaf nodes, using the
same procedure as described in III-B, with one small modification: in graphs with cycles, the term (dvjk − 1) from equation
(13) should be substituted with (duvjk − 1), where d
u
vjk
denotes the number of uninfected neighbors of vjk at time jk. Loops
in the graph cause this value to be time-varying, and also dependent on the location of v0, the candidate source. We did not
approximate the ML estimate for non-leaves because the simplifications used in Section III-B to compute the likelihood no
longer hold, leading to an exponential increase in the problem dimension.
This approach is only an approximation of the ML estimate because the virtual source could move in a loop over the social
graph (i.e., the same node could be the virtual source more than once, in nonadjacent timesteps).
On average, adaptive diffusion reached 96 percent of the network within 10 timesteps using d0 = 4. We also computed
the average distance of the true source from the estimated source over the infected subtree (Figure 12). We see that as time
progresses, so does the hop distance of the estimated source from the true source. In social networks, nearly everyone is
within a small number of hops (say, 6 hops [44]) from everyone else, so this computation is not as informative in this setting.
However, it is relevant in location-based connectivity graphs, which can induce large hop distances between nodes.
IV. SPY-BASED ADVERSARIAL MODEL
The spy-based adversary collects more detailed information than the snapshot adversary, but only for a subset of network
nodes. In this section, we provide some results stating that over d-regular trees, choosing αd(t, h) = 0 gives asymptotically
optimal hiding in d. While the proofs for these results are not included in this paper (all proofs can be found in [14]), the
results are included for completeness.
For the spy-based adversary, we model each node other than the source as a spy with probability p. At some point in time,
the source node v∗ starts propagating its message over the graph according to some spreading protocol (e.g., diffusion or
adaptive diffusion). Each spy node si ∈ V observes: (1) the time Tsi (relative to an absolute reference) at which it receives the
message, (2) the parent node psi that relayed the message, and (3) any other metadata used by the spreading mechanism (such
as control signaling in the message header). At some time, spies aggregate their observations; using the collected metadata
and the structure of the underlying graph, the adversary estimates the author of the message, vˆ.
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graph.
To define perfect obfuscation for this adversarial model, we first observe the following:
Proposition 4.1 ([14]): Under a spy-based adversary, no spreading protocol can have a probability of detection less than p.
This results from considering the first-spy estimator, which returns the parent of the first spy to observe the message.
Regardless of spreading, this estimator returns the true source with probability at least p; with probability p, the first node
(other than the true source) to see the message is a spy.
We therefore say a protocol achieves perfect obfuscation against a spy-based adversary if the ML probability of detection
conditioned on the spy probability p is bounded by
P
(
vˆML = v
∗|p ) = p+ o(p) . (34)
However, when the underlying graph is a d-regular tree, the probability of detection increases over time for standard diffusion
spreading, since the estimator receives more information. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the probability of detection
tends to 1 as degree of the underlying graph d→∞:
Proposition 4.2 ([14]): Suppose the contact network is a regular tree with degree d. There is a source node v∗, and each
node other than the source is chosen to be a spy node i.i.d. with probability p as described in the spy model. In each
timestep, each infected node infects each uninfected neighbor independently with probability q. Then the probability of detection
P(vˆML = v∗) ≥ 1− (1− qp)d.
This bound implies that as degree increases, the probability of detecting the true source of diffusion approaches 1. The
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proposition also results from analyzing the first-spy estimator. These observations suggest that diffusion provides poor anonymity
guarantees in real networks; contact networks may be high degree, and the adversary is not time-constrained.
A. Main result (Spy-based adversary)
In this section, we give results stating that over d-regular trees, adaptive diffusion with αd(t, h) = 0 achieves asymptotically
perfect obfuscation in d. We also show that adaptive diffusion hides the source better than diffusion over d-regular trees, d > 2.
However, these results depend on a slightly modified implementation of adaptive diffusion, in which some additional metadata is
passed around. This implementation, which we call the Tree Protocol, facilitates analysis and is also fully distributed, avoiding
the explicit notion of a virtual source.
Tree Protocol. The spreading protocol follows Algorithm 1 (Spreading on a tree) from [14]; the goal is to build an infected
subtree with the true source at one of the leaves. Whenever a node v passes a message to node w, it includes three pieces of
metadata: (1) the parent node pw = v, (2) a binary direction indicator uw ∈ {↑, ↓}, and (3) the node’s level in the infected
subtree mw ∈ N. The parent pw is the node that relayed the message to w. The direction bit uw flags whether node w is a
spine node, responsible for increasing the depth of the infected subtree. The level mw describes the hop distance from w to
the nearest leaf node in the final infected subtree, as t→∞.
At time t = 0, the source chooses a neighbor uniformly at random (e.g., node 1) and passes the message and metadata
(p1 = 0, u1 =↑, m1 = 1). Figure 13 illustrates an example spread, in which node 0 passes the message to node 1. Yellow
denotes spine nodes, which receive the message with uw =↑, and gray denotes those that receive it with uw =↓. Whenever
a node w receives a message, there are two cases. if uw =↑, node w chooses another neighbor z uniformly at random and
forwards the message with ‘up’ metadata: (pz = w, uz =↑, mz = mw + 1). All of w’s remaining neighbors z′ receive the
message with ‘down’ metadata: (pz′ = w, uz′ =↓, mz′ = mw − 1). For instance, in Figure 13, node 1 passes the ‘up’ message
to node 2 and the ‘down’ message to node 3. On the other hand, if uw =↓ and mw > 0, node w forwards the message to
all its remaining neighbors with ‘down’ metadata: (pz = w, uz =↓, mz = mw − 1). If a node receives mw = 0, it does not
forward the message further. Algorithm 3 describes this process more precisely.
Observe that adaptive diffusion ensures that the infected subgraph is a balanced tree with the true source at one of the
leaves. Moreover, unlike regular diffusion, the message does not reach all the nodes in the network under adaptive diffusion
(even when T =∞). Even though this may seem like a fundamental drawback for adaptive diffusion, it can be shown that the
infected subgraph has a size proportional to (d− 1)T/2 on regular trees (compared to (d− 1)T under regular diffusion). More
critically, real social networks have cycles, so neighbors of nodes with mw = 0 can still get the message from other nodes in
the network [14].
As before, this protocol ensures that the infected subgraph is a symmetric tree with the true source at one of the leaves. The
key difference between Protocol 1 (naive adaptive diffusion) with αd(t, h) = 0 and Protocol 3 (Tree Protocol) is that the latter
does not rely on message-passing from the virtual source to control spreading. Instead, it passes enough control information
to realize the same spreading pattern in a fully-distributed fashion.
Protocol 3 Tree Protocol
Input: contact network G = (V,E), source v∗, time T
Output: infected subgraph GT = (VT , ET )
1: V0 ← {v∗}
2: mv∗ ← 0 and uv∗ ←↑
3: v∗ selects one of its neighbors w at random
4: V1 ← V0 ∪ {w}
5: mw ← 1 and uw ←↑
6: t← 2
7: for t ≤ T do
8: for all v ∈ Vt−1 with uninfected neighbors and mv > 0 do
9: if uv =↑ then
10: v selects one of its uninfected neighbors w at random
11: Vt ← Vt−1 ∪ {w}
12: mw ← mw + 1 and uw ←↑
13: for all uninfected neighboring nodes z of v do
14: Vt ← Vt−1 ∪ {z}
15: uz ←↓ and mz ← mv − 1
16: t← t+ 1
In the spy-based adversarial model, each spy si in the network observes any received messages, the associated metadata,
and a timestamp Tsi . Figure 14 illustrates the information observed by each spy node, where spies are outlined in red.
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Fig. 13: Message spread using the tree protocol from [45].
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Fig. 14: The information observed by the spy nodes 3, 7, and 8 for the spread in Figure 13. Timestamps in this figure are
absolute, but they need not be.
Source Estimation. The ML source-estimation algorithm for this spreading and adversarial model is described in [14]. The
ML estimation algorithm is not necessary to understand this paper’s primary contributions. We include it in this section for
completeness, and because the probability of detection for the spy+snapshot adversarial model in Section V uses terminology
that is introduced in this estimator.
To a snapshot adversary, all leaves in the infected subgraph have the same likelihood. Because adaptive diffusion has
deterministic timing, spies only help the estimator discard candidate nodes. We assume the message spreads for infinite time.
There is at least one spy on the spine; consider the first such spy to receive the message, s0. This spine spy (along with its
parent and level metadata) allows the estimator to specify a feasible subtree in which the true source must lie. In Figure 13,
node 8 is on the spine with level m8 = 4, so the feasible subtree is rooted at node 5 and contains all the pictured nodes except
node 8 (9’s children and grandchildren also belong, but are not pictured). Spies outside the feasible subtree do not influence
the estimator, because their information is independent of the source conditioned on s0’s metadata. Only leaves of the feasible
subtree could have been the source—e.g., nodes 0, 3, 6, and 7, as well as 9’s grandchildren.
The estimator then uses spies within the feasible subtree to prune out candidates. The goal is to identify nodes in the feasible
subtree that are on the spine and close to the source. For each spy in the feasible subtree, there exists a unique path to the
spine spy s0, and at least one node on that path is on the spine; the spies’ metadata reveals the identity and level of the spine
node on that path with the lowest level—we call this node a pivot (details in Algorithm 4). For instance, in Figure 14, we can
use spies 7 and 8 to learn that node 2 is a pivot with level m2 = 2. Estimation hinges on the minimum-level pivot across all
spy nodes, `min. In the example, `min = 1, since spies 3 and 8 identify node 1 as a pivot with level m1 = 1. The true source
must lie in a subtree rooted at a neighbor of `min, with no spies. In our example, this leaves only node 0, the true source.
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Protocol 4 ML Source Estimator for Algorithm 3
Input: contact network G = (V,E), spy nodes S = {s0, s1 . . .} and metadata si : (psi ,msi , usi)
Output: ML source estimate vˆML
1: Let s0 denote the lowest-level spine spy, with metadata (ps0 ,ms0 , us0).
2: V˜ ← {v ∈ V : δH(v, s0) ≤ ms0 and ps0 ∈ P(v, s0)}
3: E˜ ← {(u, v) : (u, v) ∈ E and u, v ∈ V˜ }
4: Define the feasible subgraph as F (V˜ , E˜)
5: L← ∅ . Set of feasible pivots
6: K ← ∅ . Set of eliminated pivot neighbors
7: for all s ∈ S with s ∈ V˜ do
8: Let
[
hs,`s
h`s,s0
]
= 12
[
1 −1
1 1
]
·
[ |P (s, s0)|
Ts0 − Ts
]
9: `s ← v ∈ P(s, s0) : δH(s, `s) = hs,`s
10: ks ← v ∈ P(s, s0) : δH(s, ks) = hs,`s − 1
11: L← L ∪ {`s} . Add pivot
12: K ← K ∪ {ks} . Add pivot neighbor
13: Find the lowest-level pivot: `min ← argmin`∈Lm`
14: U ← ∅ . Candidate sources
15: for all v ∈ V˜ where v is a leaf in F (V˜ , E˜) do
16: if P(v, `min) ∩K = ∅ then
17: U ← U ∪ {v}
18: return vˆML, drawn uniformly from U
Anonymity properties. This ML estimation procedure can be analyzed to exactly compute the probability of detection for
adaptive diffusion on a d-regular tree:
Theorem 4.3 ([14]): Suppose the contact network is a regular tree with degree d > 2. There is a source node v∗, and each
node other than the source is chosen to be a spy node i.i.d. with probability p as described in the spy model. Against colluding
spies attempting to detect the location of the source, adaptive diffusion achieves the following:
(a) The probability of detection is
P(vˆML = v∗) = p+
1
d− 2 −
∞∑
k=1
qk
(d− 1)k , (35)
where qk ≡ (1− (1− p)((d−1)k−1)/(d−2))d−1 +
(1− p)((d−1)k+1−1)/(d−2).
(b) The expected distance between the source and the estimate is bounded by
E[δH(vˆML, v∗)] ≥ 2
∞∑
k=1
k · rk (36)
where |Td,k| = (d−1)
k−1
d−2 , and
rk ≡ 1d−1
(
(1− (1− p)|Td,k|)d−1 + (d− 1)(1− p)|Td,k| −
(d− 2)(1− p)|Td,k|(d−1) − 1
)
.
There are two main observations to note regarding this result:
(1) Asymptotically optimal probability of detection: As tree degree d increases, the probability of detection converges to
the degree-independent fundamental limit in Proposition 4.1, i.e., P(V ∗ = vˆML) = p. This is in contrast to diffusion, whose
probability of detection tends to 1 asymptotically in d.
(2) Expected hop distance asymptotically increasing: We observe empirically that for regular diffusion, E[δH(vˆML, v∗)]
approaches 0 as d increases. On the other hand, for adaptive diffusion with a fixed p > 0, as d→∞, lim supE[δH(vˆML, v∗)] =
2(1− p).
These observations suggest that adaptive diffusion exhibits provably stronger anonymity properties than standard diffusion
on regular trees—a suggestion that is backed up by simulations on irregular trees and the Facebook graph in [14].
V. SPY+SNAPSHOT ADVERSARIAL MODEL
The spy+snapshot adversarial model considers a natural combination of the snapshot and spy-based adversaries. At a certain
time T , the adversary collects a snapshot of the infection pattern, GT . It also collects metadata from all spies that have seen
the message up to (and including) time T . Based on these two sets of metadata, the adversary infers the source.
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Fig. 15: Probability of detection under the spy+snapshot adversarial model. As estimation time and tree degree increase, the
effect of the snapshot on detection probability vanishes.
Notably, this stronger model does not significantly impact the probability of detection as time increases. The snapshot helps
detection when there are few spies by revealing which nodes are true leaves. This effect is most pronounced for small T and/or
small p. The exact probability of detection at time T is given below:
P(vˆML = v∗) =
(1− p)|Sd,T |−1
|∂Sd,T |︸ ︷︷ ︸
no spy
+
T/2∑
k=1
{ (1− p)(|Td,k|−1) p
|∂Td,k|︸ ︷︷ ︸
`min (k
th spine node) is a spy
+
(1− p)|Td,k|(1− (1− p)|Sd,T |−|Td,k+1|)EX
[ I(X 6= d− 2)
(X + 1) |∂Td,k|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
`min (k
th spine node) not a spy
+
(1− p)|Sd,T |−(|Td,k+1|−|Td,k|)EX
[ I(X 6= d− 2)
|∂Sd,T | − (d− 2−X)|∂Td,k|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
all spy descendants of k-th spine node
}
, . (37)
where X ∼ Binom(d − 2, (1 − p)|Td,k|), |Td,k| = (d−1)
k−1
d−2 is the number of nodes in each candidate subtree for a pivot at level k, and
|∂Td,k| = (d− 1)k−1 is the number of leaf nodes in each candidate subtree.
This expression can be evaluated numerically, as shown in Figure 15, which illustrates the tradeoff between the effect of a
snapshot and spy nodes. The derivation for this expression is included in [14].
VI. CONNECTIONS TO PÓLYA’S URN PROCESSES
In this section, we make a connection between adaptive diffusion on a line and Pólya’s urn processes. In doing so, we
highlight a property of Pólya’s urn processes, which inherently provides privacy. Further, we apply the Bayesian interpretation
of Pólya’s urn processes to design a new implementation of adaptive diffusion and analyze the precise cost of revealing the
control packets to the spy nodes, in terms of leaked anonymity.
To separately characterize the price of timestamp metadata and control packets, we focus on the concrete example of a line
graph. Consider a line graph in which nodes 0 and n+ 1 are spies. One of the n nodes between the spies is chosen uniformly
at random as a source, denoted by v∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We let t0 denote the time the source starts propagating the message
according to some global reference clock. Let Ts1 = T1 + t0 and Ts2 = T2 + t0 denote the timestamps when the two spy
nodes receive the message, respectively. Knowing the spreading protocol and the metadata, the adversary uses the maximum
likelihood estimator to optimally estimate the source.
Standard diffusion. Consider a standard discrete-time random diffusion with a parameter q ∈ (0, 1) where each uninfected
neighbor is infected with probability q. The adversary observes Ts1 and Ts2 . Knowing the value of q, it computes the ML
estimate vˆML = arg maxv∈[n] PT1−T2|V ∗(Ts1−Ts2 |v), which is optimal assuming a uniform prior on v∗. Since t0 is not known,
the adversary can only use the difference Ts1−Ts2 = T1−T2 to estimate the source. We can exactly compute the corresponding
probability of detection; Figure 16 (bottom panel) illustrates that the posterior (and the likelihood) is concentrated around the
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ML estimate, and the source can only hide among O(
√
n) nodes. The detection probability correspondingly scales as 1/
√
n
(top panel).
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Fig. 16: Comparisons of probability of detection as a function of n (top) and the posterior distribution of the source for an
example with n = 101 and T2−T1 = 25 (bottom). The line with ‘control packet revealed’ uses the Pólya’s urn implementation.
Adaptive diffusion on a line. First, recall the adaptive diffusion (Protocol 1) with the choice of αd(h, t) = t−2h+2t+2 (Equation
(5)) on a line illustrated in Figure 17. At t = 0, the message starts at node 0. The source passes the virtual source to node 1,
so v2 = 1. The next two timesteps (t = 1, 2) are used to restore symmetry about v2. At t = 2, the virtual source stays with
probability α2(2, 1) = 1/2. Since the virtual source remained fixed at t = 2, at t = 4 the virtual source stays with probability
α2(4, 1) = 2/3. The key property is that if the virtual source chooses to remain fixed at the beginning of this random process,
it is more likely to remain fixed in the future, and vice versa. This is closely related to the well-known concept of Pòlya’s urn
processes; we make this connection more precise later in this section.
The protocol keeps the current virtual source with probability 2δH(vt,v
∗)
t+2 , where δH(vt, v
∗) denotes the hop distance between
the source and the virtual source, and passes it otherwise. The control packet therefore contains two pieces of information:
δH(vt, v
∗) and t.
Suppose spy nodes only observed timestamps and parent nodes but not control packets. The adversary could then numerically
compute the ML estimate vˆML = arg maxv∈[n] PT1−T2|V ∗(Ts1−Ts2 |v). We can compute the corresponding detection probability
exactly. Figure 16 shows the posterior is close to uniform (top panel) and the probability detection would scale as 1/n (bottom
panel), which is the best one can hope for. Of course, spies do observe control packets, so they can learn δH(v∗, vT ) and
identify the source with probability 1. We therefore introduce a new adaptive diffusion implementation that is robust to control
packet information.
Adaptive diffusion via Pólya’s urn. The random process governing the virtual source’s propagation under adaptive diffusion
is identical to a Pólya’s urn process [46]. We propose the following alternative implementation of adaptive diffusion. At t = 0
the protocol decides whether to pass the virtual source left (D = `) or right (D = r) with probability half. Let D denote this
random choice. Then, a latent variable q is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Thereafter, at each even time t,
the virtual source is passed with probability q or kept with probability 1 − q. It follows from the Bayesian interpretation of
Pólya’s urn processes that this process has the same distribution as the adaptive diffusion process.
Further, in practice, the source could simulate the whole process in advance. The control packet would simply reveal to
each node how long it should wait before further propagating the message. Under this implementation, spy nodes only observe
5t 3,4t 
2t 
1t 
3 42105
Fig. 17: Spreading on a line. The red node is the message source. Yellow nodes denote nodes that have been, are, or will be
the center of the infected subtree.
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timestamps Ts1 and Ts2 , parent nodes, and control packets containing the infection delay for the spy and all its descendants in
the infection. Given this, the adversary can exactly determine the timing of infection with respect to the start of the infection
T1 and T2, and also the latent variables D and q. A proof of this statement and the following proposition is provided in Section
VIII-G. The next proposition provides an upper bound on the detection probability for such an adversary.
Proposition 6.1: When the source is uniformly chosen from n nodes between two spy nodes, the message is spread according
to adaptive diffusion, and the adversary has a full access to the time stamps, parent nodes, and the control packets that is
received by the spy nodes, observations T1, T2, q and D, the adversary can compute the ML estimate:
vˆML =

T1+2
2 +
⌊
q
(
T1−2
2
)⌋
, if T1 even and D = ` ,
T1+3
2 +
⌊
q
(
T1−1
2
)⌋
, if T1 odd and D = ` ,
1 +
⌊
(1− q)
(
T1−1
2
)⌋
, if T1 odd and D = r .
(38)
where T1 is the time since the start of the spread until s1 receives the message, and q is the hidden parameter of the Pólya’s
urn process, and D is the initial choice of direction for the virtual source. This estimator achieves a detection probability upper
bounded by
P
(
V ∗ = vˆML
) ≤ pi√8√
n
+
2
n
. (39)
Equipped with an estimator, we can also simulate adaptive diffusion on a line. Figure 16 (top) illustrates that even with access
to control packets, the adversary achieves probability of detection scaling as 1/
√
n – similar to standard diffusion. For a given
value of T1, the posterior and the likelihood are concentrated around the ML estimate, and the source can only hide among
O(
√
n) nodes, as shown in the bottom panel for T1 = 58. In the realistic adversarial setting where control packets are revealed
at spy nodes, adaptive diffusion can only hide as well as standard diffusion over a line.
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONNECTIONS TO GAME THEORY
Consider a game-theoretic setting where there are two players, the protocol designer and the adversary. The designer can
choose any strategy to spread the message from a source v∗, as long as the message is passed one hop at a time. The adversary
can choose any strategy (computationally expensive or not) to compute an estimated source vˆ given a some side information
on the spread. As a result, the source can either be detected or not. In terms of the payoff, the protocol designer wants to
minimize the probability of detection and the adversary wants to maximize it.
In this static game setting, the adaptive diffusion is a (weak) dominant strategy under a certain condition. Consider a
snapshot-based adversary and a contact network of d-regular tree. The special condition we impose is that we are only allowed
protocols that infect at most, say, 1 + (2(d− 1)(T+1)/2 − d)/(d− 2) nodes. In this setting, Theorem 3.1 implies that adaptive
diffusion is dominant up to a vanishing additive factor.
Following our work [42], a game-theoretic formulation of the problem of source obfuscation was recently proposed in [47].
The designer is restricted to use deterministic protocols, and the snapshot-based adversary is restricted to use a certain family
of estimators based on Jordan centers. Under these restrictions, it is shown that there is no “dominant” protocol in Nash
equilibrium sense, other than the simple (deterministic) diffusion.
There are several interesting future research directions. First, when infecting more nodes is of priority, a fundamental question
is whether there is a dominant strategy for a given target infection rate. Adaptive diffusion achieves the fundamental limit of
P(detection) = 1/NT until NT ≤ 1 + (2(d− 1)(T+1)/2− d)/(d− 2) ' (d− 1)(T/2) (see Figure 18) on d-regular trees. It is an
open question what the fundamental limit is above this threshold, and if there is efficient distributed protocol achieving this
optimal tradeoff. In particular, if we have to spread every time deterministically to achieve the infection speed of NT ' (d−1)T ,
then the source will be trivially detected as the center of infection. Above the threshold of logNT ' 12T log(d− 1), A variant
of adaptive diffusion can achieve the infection rate αT log(d − 1) with probability of detection (α − 1)T log(d − 1) for any
α ∈ [0.5, 1]. Hence, all grey triangular region is achievable by adaptive diffusion in Figure 18.
Second, when the same source spreads multiple messages that can be linked, this can be posed as a dynamic game. If the
adversary observes multiple spreads of infection from a single source, how much does the probability of detection increase as
a function of the multiplicity of the spread? One possibility is to spread according to adaptive diffusion the first time, and use
exactly the same pattern of spread in the consecutive spread of the following messages from the same source. Hence, from the
meta-data, there is no more information on who the source is. However, this creates a certain permanent bias in the spread,
which may be undesirable, depending on the application.
Next, a set of nodes can collude to spread the exactly same message, but starting from multiple sources simultaneously with
possible delays. Unless carefully coordinated, such spread from multiple sources can be easily detected [48] and there is no
gain in collusion. However, we can consider an alternative strategy of creating a pseudo-source node to make the source hard
to find. At a certain time (possible t = 0), the protocol starts another chain of spread starting from a node far away from the
infection so far. This can improve the detection probability by a factor of the number of such new infections, at a price of
26
−T log(d− 1)
− 12T log(d− 1)
T log(d− 1)12T log(d− 1)
1
NT
Infection size (logNT )
logP(detection)
Fig. 18: The fundamental limit of P(detection) ≥ 1/NT is shown in a solid red line. This is achieved by adaptive diffusion
until log(NT ) ≤ 12T log(d− 1). Infection size at time T is shown on the x-axis in log-scale and the probability of detection
on y-axis also in log-scale.
losing the benefits of social filtering and possibly spamming the users with irrelevant messages. We want to be able to measure
such a loss in social filtering and characterize the tradeoff.
VIII. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Spreading rate. Under Protocol 1, GT is a complete (d − 1)-ary tree (with the exception that the root has d children) of
depth T/2 whenever T is even. Whenever T is odd, with probability αd(T, h), GT is again such a (d− 1)-ary tree of depth
(T + 1)/2. With probability 1− αd(T, h), GT is made up of two (d− 1)-ary trees of depth (T − 1)/2 each with their roots
connected by an edge. Therefore, it follows that when d > 2, NT is given by
NT =

1, T = 0,
2(d−1)(T+1)/2
d−2 − 2d−2 , T ≥ 1, T odd, w.p. (1− α) ,
d(d−1)(T+1)/2
d−2 − 2d−2 , T ≥ 1, T odd, w.p. α ,
d(d−1)T/2
d−2 − 2d−2 , T ≥ 2, T even ;
(40)
Similarly, when d = 2, NT can be expressed as follows:
NT =

1, T = 0,
T + 1, T ≥ 1, T odd, w.p. (1− α) ,
T + 2, T ≥ 1, T odd, w.p. α ,
T + 2, T ≥ 2, T even ;
(41)
The lower bound on NT in Equation (6) follows immediately from the above expressions.
Probability of detection. For any given infected graph GT , the virtual source vT cannot have been the source node, since
the true source always passes the token at timestep t = 1. So P(GT |v = vT ) = 0. We claim that for any two nodes that are
not the virtual source at time T , u,w ∈ GT , P(GT |u) = P(GT |w) > 0. This is true iff for any non-virtual-source node v,
there exists a sequence of virtual sources viTi=0 that evolves according to Protocol 1 with v0 = v that results in the observed
GT , and for all u,w ∈ GT \ {vT }, this sequence has the same likelihood. In a tree, a unique path exists between any pair
of nodes, so we can always find a valid path of virtual sources from a candidate node u ∈ GT \ {vT } to vT . We claim
that any such path leads to the formation of the observed GT . Due to regularity of G and the symmetry in GT , for even T ,
P(GT |v(1)) = P(GT |v(2)) for all v(1), v(2) ∈ GT with δH(v(1), vT ) = δH(v(2), vT ). Moreover, recall that the αd(t, h)’s were
designed to satisfy the distribution in Equation (4). Combining these two observations with the fact that we have (d − 1)h
infected nodes h-hops away from the virtual source, we get that for all v(1), v(2) ∈ GT \ {vT }, P(GT |v(1)) = P(GT |v(2)).
For odd T , if the virtual source remains the virtual source, then GT stays symmetric about vT , in which case the same result
holds. If the virtual source passes the token, then GT is perfectly symmetric about the edge connecting vT−1 and vT . Since
both nodes are virtual sources (former and present, respectively) and T > 1, the adversary can infer that neither node was the
true source. Since the two connected subtrees are symmetric and each node within a subtree has the same likelihood of being
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the source by construction (Equation (4)), we get that for all v(1), v(2) ∈ GT \ {vT , vT−1}, P(GT |v(1)) = P(GT |v(2)). Thus
at odd timesteps, P(vˆML = v∗) ≥ 1/(NT − 2).
B. Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, under Protocol 1 (adaptive diffusion) with αd(t, h) = 0, GT is a complete (d−1)-ary tree (with the exception that the
root has d children) of depth T/2 whenever T is even. GT is made up of two complete (d− 1)-ary trees of depth (T − 1)/2
each with their roots connected by an edge whenever T is odd. Therefore, it follows that NT is a deterministic function of T
and is given by
NT =

1, T = 0,
2(d−1)(T+1)/2
d−2 − 2d−2 , T ≥ 1, T odd ,
d(d−1)T/2
d−2 − 2d−2 , T ≥ 2, T even ;
(42)
The lower bound on NT in Equation (9) follows immediately from the above expression.
For any given infected graph GT , it can be verified that any non-leaf node could not have generated GT under the Tree
Protocol. In other words, P(GT |v non-leaf node) = 0 and v could not have started the rumor. On the other hand, we claim
that for any two leaf nodes v1, v2 ∈ GT , we have that P(GT |v1) = P(GT |v2) > 0. This is true because for each leaf node
v ∈ GT , there exists a sequence of state values {s1,u, s2,u}u∈GT that evolves according to the Tree Protocol with s1,v = 1
and s2,v = 0. Further, the regularity of the underlying graph G ensures that all these sequences are equally likely. Therefore,
the probability of correct rumor source detection under the maximum likelihood algorithm is given by PML(T ) = 1/Nl,T ,
where Nl,T represents the number of leaf nodes in GT . It can be also shown that Nl,T and NT are related to each other by
the following expression
Nl,T =
(d− 2)NT + 2
d− 1 . (43)
This proves the expression for P
(
vˆML = v
∗) given in (10).
Expected distance. For any v∗ ∈ G and any T , E[δH(v∗, vˆML)] is given by
E[δH(v∗, vˆML)] =
∑
v∈G
∑
GT
P(GT |v∗)P(vˆML = v)δH(v∗, v). (44)
As indicated above, no matter where the rumor starts from, GT is a (d − 1)-ary tree (with the exception that the root has d
children) of depth T/2 whenever T is even. Moreover, vˆML = v with probability 1/Nl,T for all v leaf nodes in GT . Therefore,
the above equation can be solved exactly to obtain the expression provided in the statement of the proposition.
C. Proof of Proposition 3.3
We upper bound the probability of detection by assuming that the adversary takes a snapshot at every time step after T ; the
adversary can also learn the exact value of T by noting the size of the snapshots in successive time steps. The structure of all
snapshots after GT depends deterministically on the binary timeseries of choices to either keep the virtual source token, or to
pass it, in each time step after T—we refer to this timeseries as KT . The timeseries KT , in turn, is random, with values that
depend probabilistically on only the timestamp (which is known to the adversary), the tree degree (known), and the virtual
source’s distance from the true source (unknown). Because adaptive diffusion does not allow the virtual source to “backtrack",
or move closer to the true source over time, the (unique) path from the true source to the virtual source vT at time T cannot
intersect the path comprised of the virtual sources after time T—call it PT—except possibly at vT itself. Therefore, let us
consider the first node in PT that is not equal to vT ; we call it vT ′ . vT ′ is necessarily a neighbor of vT . Then let us define
the largest possible subtree of GT that is rooted at vT ′ and does not contain vT ; we call this subtree TT .
Now, suppose that by observing the timeseries KT , the adversary could learn the distance between v∗ and vT exactly (this
is a worst-case assumption). Let us call that distance L. Then the source is equally likely to be any node w at a distance of
L hops from vT , such that w /∈ TT . Therefore, we can upper bound the probability of detection by conditioning on L, and
counting the number of feasible nodes w.
We assume for the sake of simplicity that all snapshots are taken at even time steps (including GT ), since snapshots at odd
time steps do not contribute any additional information, i.e., if the adversary observed GT at an odd timestep, it could recover
GT−1 from the subsequent observed snapshots, which is equivalent to observing the first snapshot at time T − 1. Then
P(vˆML = v∗) =
T/2∑
`=1
P(L = `)P(vˆML = v∗|L = `) (45)
From the previous argument, we have
P(vˆML = v∗|L = `) = 1
(d− 1)` ,
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Fig. 19: One realization of the random, irregular-tree branching process. Although each realization of the random process G(t)D
yields a labelled graph, the adversary observes GT and GT , which are unlabelled. White nodes are uninfected, grey nodes are
infected.
instead of 1/d(d− 1)`−1, since the entire subtree of GT containing PT is excluded from the set of possible candidate sources.
Additionally, it is straightforward to compute P(L = `) from the properties of adaptive diffusion:
P(L = `) =
(d− 2)(d− 1)`−1
(d− 1)T/2 − 1 ,
so the overall probability of detection is
P(vˆML = v∗) =
d− 2
d− 1 ·
1
(d− 1)T/2 − 1 ·
T
2
. (46)
Note that
NT =
d(d− 1)T/2 − 2
d− 2 =
(d− 1)T/2+1 + (d− 1)T/2 − 2
d− 2 .
Since
(
(d− 1)T/2+1 − 2) ≥ (d − 1)T/2 for all d > 2 and all even T ≥ 2, it holds that NT ≥ 2(d−1)T/2d−2 . From this, we can
conclude that T/2 ≤ logd−1NT + logd−1(d/2− 1). It also holds that for all d > 2, (d− 1)T/2 − 1 ≥ NT−13 , so we have
P(vˆML = v∗) ≤ d− 2
d− 1 ·
3
NT − 1 (logNT + log(d/2− 1)) , (47)
which gives the claim.
D. Proof of Theorem 3.5
We first analyze the probability of detection for any given estimator (see Eq. (52)); we then show that the estimator in (19)
is a MAP estimator, maximizing this probability of detection. Finally, we show that using the MAP estimator in 19 gives the
probability of detection in Eq. (17).
We begin with some definitions. Consider the following random process, in which we fix a source v∗ and generate a (random)
labelled tree G(t)D for each time t and for a given degree distribution D. At time t = 0, G
(t)
D consists of a single node v
∗, which
is given a label 1. The source v∗ draws a degree d1 from D, and generates d1 child nodes, labelled in order of creation (i.e.,
2 through d1 + 1). At the next time step, t = 1, the source picks one of these neighbors uniformly at random to be the new
virtual source and infects that neighbor. According to Protocol 1, each time a node v is infected, v draws its degree dv from D,
then generates dv − 1 labelled child nodes. So at the end of time t = 1, G(1)D contains the source and its uninfected neighbors,
as well as the new virtual source and its uninfected neighbors. An example of G(2)D is shown in Figure 19 (left panel) with
d1 = 3 and virtual source at node 3. Grey nodes are infected and white nodes are uninfected neighbors. Note that the node
labelled 1 is always exactly one hop from a leaf of G(t)D for all t > 0; also, nodes infect their neighbors in ascending order of
their labels. The leaves of G(t)D represent the uninfected neighbors of infected leaves in standard adaptive diffusion spreading
over a given graph. Define Ω(t,D) as the set of all labelled trees generated at time t according to this random process.
At some time T , the adversary observes the snapshot of infected subgraph GT . Notice that we do not need to generate the
entire contact network, since GT is conditionally independent of the rest of the contact network given its one-hop neighbors.
Hence, the we only need to generate (and consider) the one hop neighbors of GT at any given T . We use GT to denote this
random graph that includes GT and its one hop neighbors as generated according to the previously explained random process.
Notice that the adversary only observes G, which is an unlabelled snapshot of the infection and its one hop neighbors (see
Figure 19, right panel). We refer to the leaves of GT as ‘infected leaves’, denoted by ∂GT , and the leaves of GT as ‘uninfected
leaves’ denoted by ∂GT . Define
L(GT ) ≡ {G˜ ∈ Ω(T,D) | U(G˜) = GT },
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Fig. 20: L(G2) for the snapshot G2 illustrated in Figure 19. Boxes (a) and (b) illustrate the two families partitioning L(G2).
i.e., the set of all labelled graphs (generated according to the described random process) whose unlabelled representation U(G˜)
is equal to the snapshot GT . Figure 20 illustrates L(GT ) for the graph G2 in Figure 19.
We define a family CGT ,v ⊆ L(GT ) as the set of all labelled graphs whose labeling could have been generated by breadth-first
labeling of GT starting at node v ∈ ∂GT . Here breadth-first labeling is a valid order of traversal for a breadth-first search of
GT starting at node v. We restrict v to be a valid source for an adaptive diffusion spread—that is, it is an infected leaf in
∂GT . Note that a BFS labeling starting from two different nodes on the unlabelled tree can yield the same labelled graph. In
Figure 20, boxes (a) and (b) illustrate the two families contained in L(G2).
Let P(CG,v) ≡ P(G(T )D ∈ CG,v) denote the probability that the labelled graph G(T )D whose snapshot is G is generated from
a node v. From the definition of the random process for generating labelled graphs, we get
P(CGT ,v) =
( ∏
w∈GT
PD(dw)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
degrees of G
Q(GT , v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
virtual sources
|CGT ,v|︸ ︷︷ ︸
count of
isomorphisms
(48)
where PD(d) is the probability of observing degree d under degree distribution D, and
Q(GT , v) = 1v∈∂GT
dv
∏
w∈Φv,vT \{v,vT }(dw − 1)
is the probability of passing the virtual source from v to the virtual source vT given the structure of GT , where Φv,vT is the
unique path from v to vT in GT . Eq. (48) holds because for all instances in CGT ,v , the probability of the degrees of the nodes
and the probability of the path of the virtual source remain the same.
The probability of observing a given snapshot GT is precisely P(G(T )D ∈ L(GT )). Notice that CGT ,v partitions L(GT ) in to
family of labelled trees that are generated from the same source. This give the following decomposition:
P(G(T )D ∈ L(GT )) =
∑
v∈CGT
P(CGT ,v), (49)
where we define CGT as the set of possible candidates of the source that generate distinct labelled trees, i.e.
CGT ≡ {v ∈ GT |CGT ,v 6= CGT ,v′ ∀ v′ ∈ CGT , v′ 6= v} . (50)
Notice that this set is not unique, since there can be multiple nodes that represent the same family CGT ,v . We pick one of
such node v to represent the class of nodes that can generate the same family of labelled trees. We use this v to index these
families and not to denote any particular node in ∂GT .
Consider an estimate of the source vˆ(GT ). In general, vˆ(GT ) is a random variable, potentially selected from a set of candidates.
We define detection (D) as the event in which vˆ(GT ) = v1(G(T )D ); i.e., the estimator outputs the node that started the random
process. We can partition the set of candidate nodes ∂GT , by grouping together those nodes that are indistinguishable to the
estimator into classes. Precisely, we define a subset of nodes indexed by v ∈ CGT ,
χGT ,v ≡ {v′ ∈ ∂GT |CGT ,v = CGT ,v′} . (51)
For a given snapshot, there are as many classes as there are families. In Figure 20, the class associated with family (a) has
one element—namely, the node labeled ‘1’ in family (a). The class associated with family (b) contains two nodes: the node
labeled ‘1’ in family (b), and the node labeled ‘5’ in the rightmost graph of family (b), since both nodes give rise to the same
family.
We consider, without loss of generality, an estimator that selects a node in a given class with probability P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v).
Notice that |χGT ,v| denotes the number of (indistinguishable) source candidates in this class. From Eq. (49), the probability
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of detection given a snapshot is
P(D|GT ) =
P
(
G
(T )
D ∈ L(GT ) ∧D
)
P(G(T )D ∈ L(GT ))
. (52)
=
∑
v∈CGT
P(CGT ,v)P
(
D
∣∣G(T )D ∈ CGT ,v)∑
v∈CGT P(CGT ,v)
(53)
where P(D|G(T )D ∈ CGT ,v) = P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v)/|χGT ,v|. We use the following observation:
Lemma 8.1:
P(CGT ,v)/|χGT ,v|∑
v∈CGT P(CGT ,v)
=
1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) . (54)
(Proof in Section VIII-D1)
Substituting Equation (54) into Equation (53), we get that
P(D|GT ) =
∑
v∈CGT
P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v)
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\
{v,vT }
(dw − 1) .
Since each term of this summation is bounded by
P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v)
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\
{v,vT }
(dw − 1) ≤
1
min
v∈CGT
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) ,
and
∑
v∈CGT P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v) = 1, it must hold that
P(D|GT ) ≤ 1
min
v∈CGT
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) .
This upper bound on the detection probability is achieved exactly if we choose weight P(vˆ(GT ) ∈ χGT ,v) = 1 for the class(es)
minimizing the product
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }(dw − 1), i.e.,
vˆ(GT ) = arg min
v∈∂GT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1).
1) Proof of Lemma 8.1: We have that
P(CGT ,v) =
( ∏
w∈GT
PD(dw)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
degrees of G
Q(GT , v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
virtual sources
|CGT ,v|︸ ︷︷ ︸
count of
isomorphisms
where v is a feasible source for the adaptive diffusion process, i.e., a leaf of the infection GT .
The proof of the lemma proceeds in four steps:
1) We first recursively define a function H(GT , v) that is equal to |CGT ,v|. This function is defined over any balanced,
undirected tree and node; the tree need not be generated via the previously-described adaptive diffusion branching
process. In addition to H(GT , v), we are interested in H(GT , vT ).
2) We show that
P(CGT ,v) =
( ∏
v∈GT
PD(dv)
)
H(GT , vT )×
|χGT ,v|
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) . (55)
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Fig. 21: A realization of the random labeling process given an unlabeled snapshot.
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Fig. 22: The set R(T )GT ,v for the snapshot and node specified in Figure 21.
3) We show that ∑
v∈CGT ,v
P(CGT ,v) =
( ∏
v∈GT
PD(dv)
)
H(GT , vT ). (56)
4) We combine steps (2) and (3) to show the result.
Step 1 We wish to define H(GT , v)—a function that counts the number of distinct, isomorphic graphs generated by a breadth-
first search of a balanced tree GT , rooted at node v. Consider a random process defined as follows. Given GT and root node v,
the process starts at v and labels it 1. For each neighbor w of node 1, the process randomly orders w’s unlabelled neighbors,
and labels them in order of traversal. The process proceeds to label nodes in a breadth-first fashion, traversing each node’s
unlabelled neighbors in a randomly-selected order, until all nodes have been visited. Let R(t)GT ,v denote a labelled tree generated
according to the described random process (see Figure 21).
The function H(GT , v) counts the number of distinct graphs that can result from this random process over GT when starting
from node v. More precisely, define R(T )GT ,v as the set of all possible trees R
(T )
GT ,v generated according to this random labeling.
H(GT , v) is defined as the size of R(T )GT ,v . Figure 22 illustrates R
(T )
GT ,v for GT and v shown in Figure 21. In that example,
H(GT , v) = 3.
Recall that GT is a balanced tree. The Jordan center of this tree is denoted by vT . If GT was generated according to adaptive
diffusion, vT would be the virtual source at time T . Although we say GT is rooted at v, we define each node’s children with
respect to vT . That is, node z is among w’s children if z is a neighbor of w and z /∈ φ(w, vT ).
Let Gvi→vjT denote the subtree of GT rooted at node vj with node vi as parent of vj (let Gv1→v1T = GT ). Each node vi in
GT will have some number of child subtrees. Some of these subtrees may be identical (i.e., given a realization RGT ,v of the
labeling random process, they would be isomorphic); let kv denote the number of distinguishable subtrees of node v. We use
∆v1, . . . ,∆
v
kv
to denote the number of each distinct subtree appearing among the child subtrees of node v (recall children are
defined with respect to vT ). For example, node v in graph GT in Figure 21 (left panel) has ∆v1 = 1 and ∆v2 = 2, since the first
of v’s child subtrees is equal only to itself, and the second (middle) subtree is isomorphic to the subtree on the right. If there
exists a neighboring, unvisited subtree rooted at a parent of v, then we say ∆v0 = 1 (by definition, there will only be one such
subtree, and it cannot be equal to any child subtrees because GT is balanced). Otherwise, we say ∆v0 = 0. This distinction
becomes relevant if v 6= vT . For example the figure below shows a tree that is rooted at w 6= vT . In computing H(GT , w),
we have ∆w0 = 1 because there is an unvisited branch from w that contains vT , and ∆
w
1 = 2 because both child subtrees of
w are identical.
2  w
Let γv denote the unvisited neighbors of node v in GT . We give a recursive expression for computing H(GT , v).
Lemma 8.2:
H(GT , v) =
(
dv
∆v0,∆
v
1, . . . ,∆
v
k
) ∏
w∈γv
H(Gv→wT , w). (57)
Proof: We show this by induction on the depth λ of GT (rooted at v). For λ = 1, GT has a node v and dv neighbors. Every
realization of the random breadth-first labeling of GT will yield an identical graph since the neighbors of v are indistinguishable,
so H(GT , v) =
(
dv
dv
)
= 1.
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Now suppose Equation (57) holds for all graph-node pairs (GT , v) with λ < λo; we want to show that it holds for λ = λo.
We can represent GT as a root node v and dv subtrees: Gv→wT for w ∈ γv . Since each subtree has depth at most λo − 1, we
can compute H(Gv→wT , w) for each subtree Gv→wT using equation 57 (from the inductive hypothesis).
Suppose we impose (any) valid labeling on GT starting from v; we refer to the labeled graph as RG,v . Given RG,v , we
order the subtrees of a node in ascending order of their numeric labels. For any fixed ordering of the dv subtrees of v, we
have
∏
w∈γv H(Gv→wT , w) nonidentical labelings of GT that respect the ordering of subtrees and are isomorphic to any given
realization RGT ,v . At most, there can be dv! arrangements of the subtrees. However, some of the subtrees are isomorphic,
so this value over-counts the number of distinct arrangements. That is, switching the order of two nonidentical, isomorphic
subtrees is the same as preserving the order and changing both subtrees to the appropriate nonidentical, isomorphic subtree;
this is already accounted for in the product
∏
w∈γv H(G
v→w
T , w). ∆
v
j ! of the dv! permutations of v’s subtrees permute the jth
unique subtree with isomorphisms of itself. As such, the non-redundant number of different arrangements of the subtrees of
node v is dv !∆v0 !,∆v1 !...∆vkv !
=
(
dv
∆v0 ,∆
v
1 ,...,∆
v
kv
)
. This gives the expression in Equation (57).
Step 2. We want to show that
P(CGT ,v) =
( ∏
v∈GT
PD(dv)
)
H(GT , vT )|χGT ,v|
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) .
Since P(CGT ,v) =
(∏
v∈GT PD(dv)
)
Q(GT , v)H(GT , v), this is equivalent to showing that
H(GT , v)
H(GT , vT ) =
|χGT ,v|
Q(GT , v)dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1)
=
dv
dvT
|χGT ,v|.
The expressions for H(GT , vT ) and H(GT , v) differ in that the former starts at the virtual source and counts all subtrees by
“trickling down" the tree (i.e., ∆w0 = 0 for all w ∈ GT ), whereas the latter progresses from an infected leaf v to the virtual
source, then recurses over the remaining, unvisited subtrees of vT . Let Pi denote the ith node in the path from v to vT , which
has length `. We get
H(GT , v) =
(
dP1
1, dP1 − 1
)
×(
dP2 − 1
1,∆P21 − 1, . . . ,∆P2kP2
) ∏
w∈γP2\{P1,P3}
H(GP2→wT , w)×
. . .(
dP`−1 − 1
1,∆
P`−1
1 − 1, . . . ,∆P`−1kP`−1
) ∏
w∈γP`−1
\{P`−2,P`}
H(GP`−1→wT , w)×
(
dP` − 1
∆P`1 − 1, . . . ,∆P`kP`
) ∏
w∈γP`\{P`−1}
H(GP`→wT , w).
where each line corresponds to the terms that result from recursively moving up the path from v = P1 to vT = P`. Similarly,
we have
H(GT , vT ) =
(
dP1 − 1
dP1 − 1
)
×(
dP2 − 1
∆P21 , . . . ,∆
P2
kP2
) ∏
w∈γP2\{P1,P3}
H(GP2→wT , w)×
. . .(
dP`−1 − 1
∆
P`−1
1 , . . . ,∆
P`−1
kP`−1
) ∏
w∈γP`−1
\{P`−2,P`}
H(GP`−1→wT , w)×
(
dP`
∆P`1 , . . . ,∆
P`
kP`
) ∏
w∈γP`\{P`−1}
H(GP`→wT , w).
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Here we have expanded the expression in terms of the path from v to vT to make simplification clearer, where v is the node
over which we previously computed H(GT , v). Computing the ratio of H(GT , v) to H(GT , vT ), all the rightmost products of
each line cancel. We are left with the ratio of the combinatorial expressions, which simplify to
H(GT , v)
H(GT , vT ) =
dP1
dP`
∆P21 . . .∆
P`−1
1 ∆
P`
1
=
dv
dvT
∆v+11 . . .∆
vT−1
1 ∆
vT
1 . (58)
Each ∆1 denotes the number of child subtrees that are identical to the one containing v, for a given root. As such, the
product of ∆s above is precisely the number of candidates in the class being considered, or |χGT ,v|. That is, since they are
indistinguishable in the unlabelled graph, they generate the same family CGT ,v .
Step 3. We have ∑
v∈CGT
P(CGT ,v) =
∑
v∈CGT
( ∏
w∈GT
PD(dw)
)
H(GT , vT )
× |χGT ,v|
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }(dw − 1)
=
( ∏
w∈GT
PD(dw)
)
H(GT , vT )×
∑
v∈CGT
|χGT ,v|
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }(dw − 1)
=
( ∏
w∈GT
PD(dw)
)
H(GT , vT )×
∑
v∈∂GT
1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }(dw − 1)
(59)
where (59) follows because every leaf in the graph is a candidate source in exactly one class. We wish to show this last
summation sums to 1. Consider a random process over GT . The process starts at the virtual source vT , and in each timestep
it moves one hop away from vT . It chooses among the (unvisited) children of a node uniformly at random. At time T ,
the process is necessarily at one of the leaves of GT , and the probability of landing at a particular leaf v is precisely
1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }(dw−1)
. Therefore, the sum of this quantity over all leaves v ∈ ∂GT is 1.
Step 4. Combining the results from steps 3 and 4, we get that
P(CGT ,v)/|χGT ,v|∑
v∈CGT P(CGT ,v)
=(∏
w∈GT PD(dw)
)
H(GT , vT )(∏
w∈GT PD(dw)
)
H(GT , vT )
× |χGT ,v|/|χGT ,v|
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )
\{v,vT }
(dw − 1)
1
dvT
∏
w∈φ(v,vT )\{v,vT }
(dw − 1) .
E. Proof of Theorem 3.7
To facilitate the analysis, we consider an alternative random process that generates unlabeled graphs G′T according to the
same distribution as GT (i.e., the infected, unlabeled subgraph embedded in U(G
(T )
D ) from the proof of Theorem 3.5). For a
given degree distribution D and a stopping time T , the new process is defined as a Galton-Watson process in which the set of
offsprings at the first time step is drawn from D and the offsprings at subsequent time steps are drawn from D − 1. At time
t = 0, a given root node vT draws its degree dvT from D, and generates dvT child nodes. The resulting tree now has depth
1. In each subsequent time step, the process traverses each leaf v of the tree, draws its degree from D, and generates dv − 1
children. The random process continues until the tree has depth T/2, since under adaptive diffusion, the infected subgraph
at even time T has depth T/2. Because the probability of detection in Equation (17) does not depend on the degrees of the
leaves of GT , the random process stops at depth T/2 rather than T/2 + 1. We call the output of this random process G′T .
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Fig. 23: Pruning of a snapshot. In this example, the distribution D allows nodes to have degree 2 or 3, so we prune all
descendants of nodes with degree 3 that are more than c log(t0) hops from the root. In this example, p1(f1 − 1) < 1 and the
pruned random process eventually goes extinct.
The distribution of G′T is identical to the distribution as the previous random process imposed on GT , which follows from
Equation (56) in the proof of Theorem 3.5. We therefore use GT to denote the resulting output in the remainder of this proof.
Distribution D is a multinomial distribution with support f = (f1, . . . , fη) and probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pη). Without loss
of generality, we assume 2 ≤ f1 < . . . < fη . Let µD denote the mean number of children generated by D:
µD =
η∑
i=1
pi(fi − 1).
There are two separate classes of distributions, which we deal with as separate cases.
Case 1: When p1(f1− 1) > 1, we claim that with high probability, there exists a leaf node v in ∂GT such that on the unique
path from the root vT to this leaf v, all nodes in this path have the minimum degree f1, except for a vanishing fraction. To
prove this claim, consider a different graph HT derived from GT by pruning large degree nodes:
1) For a fixed, positive c, find t0 such that T/2 = t0 + c log(t0).
2) Initialize HT to be identical to GT .
3) For each node v ∈ HT , if the hop distance δH(v, vT ) ≤ c log(t0), do not modify that node.
4) For each node v ∈ HT , if the hop distance δH(v, vT ) > c log(t0) and dv > f1, prune out all the children of v, as well
as all their descendants (Figure 23).
We claim that this pruned process survives with high probability. The branching process that generates HT is equivalent
to a Galton-Watson process that uses distribution D − 1 for the first c log(t0) generations, and a different degree distribution
D′ − 1 for the remaining generations; D′ has support f ′ = (f1, 1), probability mass p′ = (p1, 1− p1), and mean number of
children µD′ = p1(f1 − 1).
Note that f1 ≥ 3 by the assumption that p1(f1 − 1) > 1. Hence, the inner branching process up to c log t0 has probability
of extinction equal to 0. This means that at a hop distance of t0 from vT , there are at least (f1 − 1)c log(t0) nodes. Each
of these nodes can be thought of as the source of an independent Galton-Watson branching process with degree distribution
D′ − 1. By the properties of Galton-Watson branching processes ([49], Thm. 6.1), since µD′ > 1 by assumption, each
independent branching process’ asymptotic probability of extinction is the unique solution of gD′(s) = s, for s ∈ [0, 1), where
gD′(s) = p1 s
f1−1 + (1 − p1) denotes the probability generating function of the distribution D′. Call this solution θD′ . The
probability of any individual Galton-Watson process going extinct in the first generation is exactly 1− p1. It is straightforward
to show that gD′(s) is convex, and gD′(1−p1) > 1−p1, which implies that the probability of extinction is nondecreasing over
successive generations and upper bounded by θD′ . Then for the branching process that generates HT , the overall probability
of extinction (for a given time T ) is at most θ(f1−1)
c log t0
D′ . Increasing the constant c therefore decreases the probability of
extinction. If there exists at least one leaf at depth T (i.e., extinction did not occur), then there exists at least one path in HT
of length t0 − c log t0 in which every node (except possibly the final one) has the minimum degree f1. This gives
log(ΛHT )
T/2
≤ t0 log(f1 − 1) + c log(t0) log(fη − 1)
t0 + c log(t0)
(60)
≤ log(f1 − 1) + c log t0
t0
log
fη − 1
f1 − 1 , (61)
with probability at least 1− θ(f1−1)c log t0D′ = 1− θt
c log(f1−1)
0
D′ = 1− e−CD′ t0 , where CD′ = log(θD′) and the upper bound in
(60) comes from assuming all the interior nodes have maximum degree fη . Since HT is a subgraph of a valid snapshot GT ,
there exists a path in GT from the virtual source vT to a leaf of the tree where the hop distance of the path is exactly T/2,
and at least t0 nodes have the minimum degree f1. Since the second term in (61) is o(t0), the claim follows. The lower bound
log(ΛHT )/(T/2) ≥ log(f1−1) holds by definition. Therefore, for any δ > 0, by setting T (and consequently, t0) large enough,
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Fig. 24: Pruning of a snapshot using multiple types. In this example, the distribution D allows nodes to have degree 2 or 3.
We take t0 = 2 and r = 0.5, so all descendants of nodes with type rt0 = 1 are pruned.
we can make the second term in (61) arbitrarily small. Thus, for T ≥ C ′D,δ , where C ′D,δ is a constant that depends only on
the degree distribution and δ, the result holds.
Case 2: Consider the case when p1(f1 − 1) ≤ 1. By the properties of Galton-Watson branching processes ([49], Thm. 6.1),
the previous pruned random process that generated graphs HT goes extinct with probability approaching 1. This implies that
with high probability there is no path from the root to a leaf that consists of only minimum degree nodes.
Instead, we introduce a Galton-Watson process with multiple types, derived from the original process. Our approach is to
assign a numeric type to each node in GT according to the number of non-minimum-degree nodes in the unique path between
that node and the virtual source. If a node’s path to vT contains too many nodes of high degree, then we prune the node’s
descendants. The challenge is to choose the smallest pruning threshold that still ensures the pruned tree will survive with high
probability. Knowing this threshold allows us to precisely characterize ΛGT for most of the instances.
To simplify the discussion, we start by considering a special case in which D allows nodes to take only two values of
degrees, i.e., η = 2. We subsequently extend the results for η = 2 to larger, finite values of η. With a slight abuse of a notation,
consider a new random process HT derived from GT by pruning large degree nodes in the following way:
1) For a fixed, positive c, find t0 such that T/2 = t0 + c log(t0).
2) Initialize HT to be identical to GT .
3) For each node v ∈ HT , if the hop distance δH(v, vT ) ≤ c log(t0), do not modify that node, and assign it type 0.
4) For each node v ∈ HT , if the hop distance δH(v, vT ) > c log(t0), assign v a type ξv , which is the number of nodes in
φ(w, v)\{v} that have the maximum possible degree f2, where w is the closest node in HT to v such that δH(w, vT ) ≤
c log(t0) (Figure 24).
5) Given a threshold r ∈ (0, 1), if a node v has type ξv ≥ rt0, prune out all the descendants of v. For example, in Figure
24, if t0 = 2 and the threshold is r = 0.5, we would prune out all descendants of nodes with ξv ≥ 1.
We show that for an appropriately-chosen threshold r, this pruned tree survives with high probability. By choosing the
smallest possible r, we ensure that ΛHT consists (in all but a vanishing fraction of nodes) of a fraction r nodes with maximum
degree, and (1− r) of minimum degree. This allows us to derive the bounds on log(ΛHT )/(T/2) stated in the claim, which
hold with high probability.
Let k ≡ rt0. The process that generates HT is equivalent to a different random branching process that generates nodes
in the following manner: set the root’s type ξvT = 0. At time t = 0, the root vT draws a number of children according to
distribution D, and generates dvT children, all type 0. Each leaf generates type 0 children according to child degree distribution
D− 1 until c log(t0) generations have passed. At that point, each leaf v in this branching process (which necessarily has type
0) reproduces as follows: if its type ξv > k, then v does not reproduce. Otherwise, it either generates (f1 − 1) children with
probability p1, each with state ξv , or it generates (f2 − 1) children with probability p2, each with state ξv + 1. This continues
for t0 generations. Mimicking the notation from Case 1, we use D′ to denote the distribution that gives rise to this modified,
multi-type random process (in the final t0 generations); this is a slight abuse of notation since the branching dynamics are
multi-type, not defined by realizations of i.i.d. degree random variables.
Lemma 8.3: Consider a Galton-Watson branching process with child degree distribution D−1, where each node has at least
one child with probability 1, and µD−1 > 1. Then the number of leaves in generation t, Z(t), satisfies the following:
Z(t) ≥ eC`t
with probability at least 1− eC′`t, where both C` and C ′` are constants that depend on the degree distribution.
(Proof in Section VIII-E1)
The first c log(t0) generations ensure that with high probability, we have at least eC` log t0 independent multi-type Galton-
Watson processes originating from the leaves of the inner subgraph; this follows from Lemma 8.3. Here we have encapsulated
the constant c from the first c log(t0) generations in the constant C`. For example, in Figure 24, there are 3 independent
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Galton-Watson processes starting at the leaves of the inner subgraph. We wish to choose r such that the expected number
of new leaves generated by each of these processes, at each time step, is large enough to ensure that extinction occurs with
probability less than one. For brevity, let α ≡ p1(f1 − 1) and let β ≡ p2(f2 − 1). Let x(t) denote the (k + 1)-dimensional
vector of the expected number of leaves generated with each type from 0 to k in generation t. This vector evolves according
to the following (k + 1)× (k + 1) transition matrix M :
x(t+1) = x(t)

α β
. . .
. . . α β
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
.
The last row of M is 0 because a node with type k does not reproduce. Since the root of each process always has type 0, we
have x(0) = e1, where e1 is the indicator vector with a 1 at index 1 and zeros elsewhere.
Let Z(t) denote the expected number of new leaves created in generation t. This gives
E[Z(t)] = e1M t1ᵀ(k+1), (62)
where ᵀ denotes a transpose, and 1(k+1) is the (k + 1) all-ones vector. When t < k, this is a simple binomial expansion of
(α+ β)t. For t ≥ k, this is a truncated expansion up to k:
E[Z(t)] =
k∑
i=0
(
t
i
)
αt−iβi. (63)
We seek the necessary and sufficient condition on r for non-extinction, such that (1/t) log(E[Z(t)]) > 0. Consider a binomial
random variable W with parameter β/(α+ β) = β/µD and t trials. Equation (63) implies that for large t,
E[Z(t)] = (α+ β)t P(W ≤ k). (64)
= µtD exp
{
− tDKL
(
r ‖ β
µD
)
+ o(t)
}
, (65)
by Sanov’s theorem [50]. We wish to identify the smallest r for which (1/t) log(E[Z(t)]) is bounded away from zero. Such
an r is a sufficient (and necessary) condition for the multi-type Galton-Watson process to have a probability of extinction less
than 1. To achieve this, we define the following set of r such that Eq. (65) is strictly positive, for some  > 0:
Rα,β() =
{
r | log(µD) ≥ DKL(r‖β/µD) + 
}
, (66)
Suppose we now choose a threshold r ∈ Rα,β(). This is the regime where the modified Galton-Watson process with
threshold r has a chance for survival. In other words, the probability of extinction θD′ is strictly less than one. Precisely,
θD′ is the unique solution to s = gD′(s), where gD′(s) denotes the probability generating function of the described multi-
type Galton-Watson process. Using the same argument as in Case 1, we can construct a process where the probability of
extinction is asymptotically zero. Precisely, we modify the pruning process such that we do not prune any leaves in the first
c log(t0) generations. This ensures that with high probability, there are at least eC` log(t0) independent multi-type Galton-Watson
processes evolving concurrently after time c log(t0), each with probability of extinction θD′ . Hence with probability at least
1− e−2CD′ t0 (for an appropriate choice of a constant CD′ that only depends on the degree distribution D′ and the choice of
r), the overall process does not go extinct.
Our goal is to find the choice of r with minimum product of degrees log(ΛGT )/(T/2) that survives. We define r1 as follows:
r1 ≡ arg min
r∈Rα,β()
(1− r) log(1− f1) + r log(1− f2).
Since Rα,β() is just an interval and we are minimizing a linear function with a positive slope, the optimal solution is
r1 = infr∈Rα,β() r. This is a choice that survives with high probability and has the minimum product of degrees. Precisely,
with probability at least 1− e−CD′T , where CD′ depends on D′ and , we have that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
≤ 〈r1, f〉+ c log(t0)
t0
log (f2 − 1)
where with a slight abuse of notation, we define 〈r1,f〉 , (1− r1) log(f1 − 1) + r1 log(f2 − 1). It follows that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
− 〈r∗,f〉 ≤
(r1 − r∗) log
(
f2 − 1
f1 − 1
)
+
c log(t0)
t0
log (f2 − 1) (67)
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By setting  small enough and t0 large enough, we can make this as small as we want. For any given δ > 0, there exists a
positive  > 0 such that the first term is bounded by δ/2. Further, recall that T/2 = c log(t0) + t0. For any choice of , there
exists a tD′, such that for all T ≥ tD′, the vanishing term in Eq. (65) is smaller than . For any given δ > 0, there exists
a positive tD′,δ such that T ≥ tD′,δ implies that the second term is upper bounded by δ/2. Putting everything together (and
setting  small enough for the target δ), we get that
P
( log(ΛGT )
T/2
≥ 〈r∗,f〉+ δ
)
≤ e−CD′,δT (68)
for all T ≥ C ′D′,δ , where CD′,δ and C ′D′,δ are positive constants that only depend on the degree distribution D′ and the choice
of δ > 0.
For the lower bound, we define the following set of r such that Eq. (65) is strictly negative:
Rα,β() =
{
r | log(µD) ≤ DKL(r‖β/µD)− 
}
. (69)
Choosing r ∈ Rα,β() causes extinction with probability approaching 1. Explicitly, P(Z(t) 6= 0) is the probability of non-
extinction at time t, and P(Z(t) 6= 0) ≤ E[Z(t)]. By Equation (65), we have
E[Z(t)] ≤ et(log(µD)−DKL(r‖β/µD)+o(t))
where log(µD) −DKL(r‖β/µD) ≤ −. The probability of extinction is therefore at least 1 − E[Z(t)] ≥ 1 − e−t(+o(t)). So
defining
r2 ≡ arg max
r∈Rα,β()
(1− r) log(1− f1) + r log(1− f2),
we have
log(ΛGT )
T/2
≥ 〈r2,f〉+ c log(t0)
t0
log(f1 − 1)
with probability at least 1− e−CD′,2T where CD′,2 is again a constant that depends on D′ and . It again follows that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
− 〈r∗,f〉 ≥
(r2 − r∗) log
(
f2 − 1
f1 − 1
)
+
c log(t0)
t0
log (f1 − 1) , (70)
where r2 − r∗ is strictly negative. Again, for any given δ > 0, there exists a positive  > 0 such that the first term is lower
bounded by −δ/2, and for any choice of , there exists a tD′, such that for all T ≥ tD′, the vanishing term in Eq. (65)
is smaller than . Note that this  might be different from the one used to show the upper bound. We ultimately choose the
smaller of the two  values. For any given δ > 0, there exists a positive tD′,δ such that T ≥ tD′,δ implies that the second term
is lower bounded by −δ/2. Putting everything together (and setting  small enough for the target δ), we get that
P
( log(ΛGT )
T/2
≤ 〈r∗,f〉 − δ
)
≤ e−CD′,δT (71)
for all T ≥ C ′D′,δ , where CD′,δ and C ′D′,δ are positive constants that only depend on the degree distribution D′ and the choice
of δ > 0. This gives the desired result.
We now address the general case for D with support greater than two. We follow the identical structure of the argument.
The first major difference is that node types are no longer scalar, but tuples. Each node v’s type ξv is the (η− 1)-tuple listing
how many nodes in the path φ(w, v) \ {v} had each non-minimum degree from f2 to fη , where w is the closest node to v
such that δH(w, vT ) ≤ c log(t0). Consequently, the threshold r = [r1, . . . , rη−1] is no longer a scalar, but a vector-valued,
pointwise threshold on each element of ξv . We let k = [k1 = r1t0, . . . , kη−1 = rη−1t0] denote the time-dependent threshold,
and we say k < ξv if ki < (ξv)i for 1 ≤ i ≤ η − 1. The matrix M is no longer second-order, but a tensor. Equation (62)
still holds, except M is replaced with its tensor representation. For brevity, let α = p1(f1 − 1) and βi = pi+1(fi+1 − 1). Let
β˜ =
∑η−1
i=1 βi. Hence, Equation (63) gets modified as
E[Z(t)] =
k1∑
i1=0
. . .
kη−1∑
iη−1=0
(
t
i1, . . . , iη−1
)
αt−β˜βi11 . . . β
iη−1
η−1 . (72)
Now we consider a multinomial variable W with parameters βi/µD for 1 ≤ i ≤ η − 1 and t trials. Note that α/µD is the
‘failure’ probability (corresponding to a node of degree f1); such events do not contribute to the category count, so the sum
of parameters is strictly less than 1. As before, equation (72) can equivalently be written as
E[Z(t)] = µtD P(W ≤ k)
= µtD exp
{
− tDKL
(
r ‖
(
β
µD
))
+ o(t)
}
, (73)
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where β/µD denotes elementwise division. Once again, we wish to obtain bounds on P(W ≤ k). As before, we define the
following set of r such that Eq. (73) is strictly positive, for some  > 0:
Rα,β() =
{
r | log(µD) ≥ DKL(r‖
(
β
µD
)
) + 
}
, (74)
We now choose a threshold r ∈ Rα,β(). Using the same argument as before, we can construct a process where the probability
of extinction is asymptotically zero. We again do not prune any leaves in the first c log(t0) generations. This ensures that with
high probability, there are at least eC` log(t0) independent multi-type Galton-Watson processes evolving concurrently after time
c log(t0), each with probability of extinction θD′ . Hence with probability at least 1− e−2CD′ t0 (for an appropriate choice of
a constant CD′ that only depends on the degree distribution D′ and the choice of r), the overall process does not go extinct.
We define r1 analogously to the η = 2 case:
r1 ≡ arg min
r∈Rα,β()
〈r,f〉 ,
where we now define 〈r,f〉 ≡ (1−∑i ri) log(f1−1)+∑η−1j=1 rj log(fj+1−1). Therefore with probability at least 1−e−CD′T ,
where CD′ depends on D′ and , we have that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
≤ 〈r1,f〉+ c log(t0)
t0
log (fη − 1) .
It follows that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
− 〈r∗,f〉 ≤
η−1∑
j=1
((r1)j − r∗j ) log
(
fj+1 − 1
f1 − 1
)
+
c log(t0)
t0
log (fη − 1) . (75)
By setting  small enough and t0 large enough, we can make this as small as we want. For any given δ > 0, there exists a
positive  > 0 such that each term in the summation in (75) is bounded by δ/η. Further, recall that T/2 = c log(t0) + t0. For
any choice of , there exists a tD′, such that for all T ≥ tD′, the vanishing term in Eq. (65) is smaller than . For any given
δ > 0, there exists a positive tD′,δ such that T ≥ tD′,δ implies that the second term of (75) is upper bounded by δ/η. Putting
everything together (and setting  small enough for the target δ), we get that
P
( log(ΛGT )
T/2
≥ 〈r∗,f〉+ δ
)
≤ e−CD′,δT (76)
for all T ≥ C ′D′,δ , where CD′,δ and C ′D′,δ are positive constants that only depend on the degree distribution D′ and the choice
of δ > 0.
For the lower bound, we again define a set of r such that Eq. (65) is strictly negative:
Rα,β() =
{
r | log(µD) ≤ DKL(r‖
(
β
µD
)
)− } . (77)
Choosing r ∈ Rα,β() causes extinction with probability approaching 1. Explicitly, P(Z(t) 6= 0) is the probability of non-
extinction at time t, and P(Z(t) 6= 0) ≤ E[Z(t)]. By Equation (65), we have
E[Z(t)] ≤ et(log(µD)−DKL(r‖β/µD)+o(t))
where log(µD) −DKL(r‖β/µD) ≤ −. The probability of extinction is therefore at least 1 − E[Z(t)] ≥ 1 − e−t(+o(t)). So
defining
r2 ≡ arg max
r∈Rα,β()
〈r,f〉 ,
we have
log(ΛGT )
T/2
≥ 〈r2,f〉+ c log(t0)
t0
log(f1 − 1)
with probability at least 1− e−CD′,2T where CD′,2 is again a constant that depends on D′ and . It follows that
log(ΛGT )
T/2
− 〈r∗,f〉 ≥
η−1∑
j=1
((r2)j − r∗j ) log
(
fj+1 − 1
f1 − 1
)
+
c log(t0)
t0
log (fη − 1) . (78)
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where (r2)j − r∗j is strictly negative. Again, for any given δ > 0, there exists a positive  > 0 such that each term in the
summation in (78) is lower bounded by −δ/η, and for any choice of , there exists a tD′, such that for all T ≥ tD′, the
vanishing term in Eq. (65) is smaller than . We again choose the smaller of the two  values from the upper and lower bound.
For any given δ > 0, there exists a positive tD′,δ such that T ≥ tD′,δ implies that the second term is lower bounded by −δ/η.
Putting everything together (and setting  small enough for the target δ), we get that
P
( log(ΛGT )
T/2
≤ 〈r∗,f〉 − δ
)
≤ e−CD′,δT (79)
for all T ≥ C ′D′,δ , where CD′,δ and C ′D′,δ are positive constants that only depend on the degree distribution D′ and the choice
of δ > 0. This gives the desired result.
1) Proof of Lemma 8.3: If f1 > 2, then the claim follows directly, because each leaf generates at least 2 children in each
generation.
If f1 = 2, then for parameters ρ > 0 and λ > 0, we use the Markov inequality to get
P(Z(t) ≤ ρ) ≤ E[e−λZ(t) ]eρλ
= g
(t)
D−1(e
−λ)eρλ ,
where gD−1(s) = E[es(D−1)] is the probability generating function of D − 1, and g(t)D−1(s) is the t-fold composition of this
function. The goal is to choose parameters ρ and λ such that this quantity approaches zero exponentially fast. The challenge
is understanding how g(t)D−1(e
−λ) behaves for a given choice of λ.
Figure 25 illustrates gD−1(s). Because each node always has at least one child, the probability of extinction for this branching
process is 0. As such, the probability generating function is convex, with gD−1(0) = 0 and gD−1(1) = 1. This implies that for
any starting point e−λ, the fixed-point iteration method approaches 0. We characterize the rate at which g(t)D−1(s0) approaches
0 by separately bounding the rate of convergence in three different regions of s (Figure 25). First, we choose a starting point
s0 = e
−λ. We pick any value s1 < 1, such that the slope is strictly larger than one, i.e. g′D−1(s1) > 1. There may be multiple
points that satisfy this property; we can choose any one of them, since it only changes the constant factor in the exponent.
Without loss of generality, we assume that s0 > s1, since otherwise we can start the analysis from the region III. Then region
I consists of all s ∈ [s1, s0]. To define s2, we draw a line segment parallel to the diagonal from s1. The intersection is defined
as (s2, gD−1(s2)). Region II consists of all s ∈ [s2, s1). Finally, we choose a threshold , below which we say the process has
converged. Then region III consists of all s ∈ [, s2). We wish to identify a time t that guarantees, for a given  and λ, that
g
(t)
D−1(e
−λ) ≤ .
(1,1)
(0,0)
1( )Dg s
2s 1s 0s
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Fig. 25: Regions of the probability generating function, in which we bound the rate of convergence.
To begin, we split the time spent in each region into t1, t2, and t3, with t1 + t2 + t3 = t. We first characterize t1. Note
that gD−1(s0) ≤ 1− g′D−1(s1)(1− s0) for s0 in region I. This holds because s1 has the lowest slope of all points in region
I. Applying this recursively, we get that
g
(t1)
D−1(s) ≤ max
{
1− g′D−1(s1)t1(1− s), gD−1(s1)
}
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for all s in region I. In region II, we instead upper bound gD−1(s) by the line segment joining gD−1(s1) and gD−1(s2). This
line has slope 1, giving
g
(t2)
D−1(s) ≤ max {gD−1(s1)− (s1 − gD−1(s1))t2, gD−1(s2)} .
In region III, we upper bound gD−1(s) by the line y(s) = g′D−1(s2)s. We have that gD−1(s) < g
′
D−1(s2) · s for s in region
III. Recursing this relation gives
g
(t3)
D−1(s) ≤ max
{
g′D−1(s2)
t3 · s, } .
Thus, if t ≥ 3 max{t1, t2, t3}, then g(t)D−1(e−λ) ≤ . In particular, we choose
t ≥ 3 max{ log((1− gD−1(s1))/(1− e−λ))
log(g′D−1(s1))
,
gD−1(s1)− gD−1(s2)
s1 − gD−1(s1) ,
log()
s2 log(g′D−1(s2))
}
. (80)
So for sufficiently large t, we have P(Z(t) ≤ ρ) ≤  · eρλ. By choosing
 = g′D−1(s2)
s2t/3,
we ensure that the third bound on t is always true, and the other two are constant. Similarly, we choose
e−λ = 1− 1− s2
g′D−1(s1)t/3
,
giving
P(Z(t) ≤ ρ) ≤ s2 · g′D−1(s2)t/3
1− 1− s2g′D−1(s1)t/3︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

−ρ
= s2 · g′D−1(s2)t/3 (1−B)−
1
BBρ
≤ s2 · g′D−1(s2)t/3eρ(1−s2)g
′
D−1(s1)
−t/3
.
Choosing ρ = g′D−1(s1)
t/3/(1−s2), we observe that for t larger than the bound in (80), the number of leaves is lower bounded
by an exponentially growing quantity (ρ) with probability approaching 1 exponentially fast in t.
F. Proof of Proposition 3.9
Number of nodes. T is either even or odd. At each even T , GT is a ball (defined over a grid graph) centered at the virtual
source with radius T/2; that is, GT consists of all nodes whose distance from the virtual source is at most T/2 hops. Thus
at each successive even T , GT increases in radius by one. The perimeter of such a ball (over a two-dimensional grid) is 4T2 .
The total number of nodes is therefore 1 +
∑T/2
i=1 4i =
1
2 (T
2 + 2T + 2).
When T is odd, there are two cases. Either the virtual source did not move, in which case NT = NT+1 (because all
the spreading occurs in one time step), or the virtual source did move, so spreading occurs over two timesteps. In the latter
case, the odd timestep adds a number of nodes that is at least half plus one of the previous timestep’s perimeter nodes:
NT ≥ NT−1 + 2T−12 + 1 = 12 (T 2 + 2T + 1). This is the smaller of the two expressions, so we have NT ≥ (T + 1)2/2.
Probability of detection. At each even T , GT is symmetric about the virtual source. We reiterate that the snapshot adversary
can only see which nodes are infected—it has no information about who infected whom.
In order to ensure that each node is equally likely to be the source, we want the distribution of the (strictly positive) distance
from the virtual source to the true source to match exactly the distribution of nodes at each viable distance from the virtual
source:
p(t) =
4
t( t2 + 1)

1
2
...
t/2
 ∈ Rt/2 . (81)
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Protocol 5 Grid adaptive diffusion
Input: grid contact network G = (V,E), source v∗, time T
Output: set of infected nodes VT
1: V0 ← {v∗}, h← 0, v0 ← v∗
2: K ← {N,S,E,W} . Cardinality directions
3: let kv(u) denote u’s direction with respect to v
4: v∗ selects one of its neighbors u at random
5: V1 ← V0 ∪ {u}, v1 ← u
6: hH = 1{kv(u)=E} − 1{kv(u)=W}
7: hV = 1{kv(u)=N} − 1{kv(u)=S}
8: let NK(u) represent u’s neighbors in directions K ⊆ K
9: V2 ← V1 ∪NK(u) \ {v∗}, v2 ← v1
10: t← 3
11: for t ≤ T do
12: vt−1 selects a random variable X ∼ U(0, 1)
13: if X ≤ α(t− 1, |hV |+ |hH |) then
14: for all v ∈ N(vt−1) do
15: Infection Message(G,vt−1,v,{kv(vt−1)}, Gt)
16: else
17: K ← ∅
18: if hH < 0 then
19: K ← K ∪ {E}
20: else if hH > 0 then
21: K ← K ∪ {W}
22: if hV < 0 then
23: K ← K ∪ {N}
24: else if hV > 0 then
25: K ← K ∪ {S}
26: vt−1 randomly selects u ∈ NK\K(vt−1)
27: hH = hH + 1{kv(u)=E} − 1{kv(u)=W}
28: hV = hV + 1{kv(u)=N} − 1{kv(u)=S}
29: vt ← u
30: for all v ∈ NK\{kvt−1 (v)(vt)} do
31: Infection Message(G,vt,v,{kvt(vt−1), kv(vt)},Vt)
32: if t+ 1 > T then
33: break
34: Infection Message(G,vt,v,{kvt(vt−1), kv(vt)},Vt)
35: t← t+ 2
36: procedure INFECTION MESSAGE(G,u,v,K,Vt)
37: if v ∈ Vt then
38: for all w ∈ NK\K(v) do
39: Infection Message(G,v,w,K,Gt)
40: else
41: Vt ← Vt−2 ∪ {v}
There are 4h nodes at distance h from the virtual source, and by symmetry all of them are equally likely to have been the
source, giving:
P(GT |v∗, δH(v∗, vt) = h) = 1
4h
p
(t)
h
=
1
t( t2 − 1)
,
which is independent of h. Thus all nodes in the graph are equally likely to have been the source. The claim is that by choosing
α(t, h) according to Equation (31), we satisfy the distribution in 81.
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The state transition can be represented as the usual ((t/2) + 1)× (t/2) dimensional column stochastic matrix:
p(t+2) =

α(t, 1)
1− α(t, 1) α(t, 2)
1− α(t, 2) . . .
. . . α(t, t/2)
1− α(t, t/2)
 p
(t).
This relation holds because we have imposed the condition that the virtual source never moves closer to the true source. We
can solve directly for α(t, 1) = t/(t+ 4), and obtain a recursive expression for α(t, h) when h > 1:
α(t, h) =
t
t+ 4
− h− 1
h
(1− α(t, h− 1)) . (82)
We show by induction that this expression evaluates to Equation (31). For h = 2, we have α(t, 2) = tt+4 − 12 4t+4 = t−2t+4 . Now
suppose that Equation (31) holds for all h < h0. We then have
α(t, h0) =
t
t+ 4
− h0 − 1
h0
(1− t− 2(h0 − 1)
t+ 4
)
=
t− 2(h0 − 1)
t+ 4
,
which is the claim.
By construction the ML estimator for even T is to choose any node except the virtual source uniformly at random. For
odd T , there are two options: either the virtual source stayed fixed or it moved. If the former is true, then spreading occurs
in one timestep, so the ML estimator once again chooses a node other than the virtual source uniformly at random. If the
virtual source moved, then GT is symmetric about the edge connecting the old virtual source to the new one. Since the
adversary only knows that virtual sources cannot be the true source, the ML estimator chooses one of the remaining NT − 2
nodes uniformly at random. This gives a probability of detection of 1/(NT − 2). The claim follows from observing that
NT ≥ 12 (T + 1)2 − 2 = (T+3)(T−1)2 .
G. Proof of Proposition 6.1
The control packet at spy node s1 includes the amount of delay at s1 = 0 and all descendants of s1, which is the set of
nodes {−1,−2, . . .}. The control packet at spy node s2 includes the amount of delay at s2 = n + 1 and all descendants of
s2, which is the set of nodes {n+ 2, n+ 3, . . .}. Given this, it is easy to figure out the whole trajectory of the virtual source
for time t ≥ T1. Since the virtual source follow i.i.d. Bernoulli trials with probability q, one can exactly figure out q from the
infinite Bernoulli trials. Also the direction D is trivially revealed.
To lighten the notations, let us suppose that T1 ≤ T2 (or equivalently Ts1 ≤ Ts2 ). Now using the difference of the observed
time stamps Ts2 −Ts1 and the trajectory of the virtual source between Ts1 and Ts2 , the adversary can also figure out the time
stamp T1 with respect to the start of the infection. Further, once the adversary figures out T1 and the location of the virtual
source vT1 , the timestamp T2 does not provide any more information. Hence, the adversary performs ML estimate using T1, D
and q. Let B(k, n, q) =
(
n
k
)
qk(1− q)n−k denote the pmf of the binomial distribution. Then, the likelihood can be computed
for T1 as
P(adaptive)T1|V ∗,Q,D
(
t1
∣∣v∗, q, `) = {
q B(v∗ − t12 − 2, t12 − 2, q) I(v∗∈[2+ t12 ,t1]) , if t1 even ,
B(v∗ − t1+32 , t1−32 , q) I(v∗∈[ t1+32 ,t1]) , if t1 odd ,
(83)
P(adaptive)T1|V ∗,Q,D
(
t1
∣∣ v∗, q, r) = {
0 , if t1 even ,
(1− q)B( t1−12 − v∗, t1−32 , q) I(v∗∈[1, t1−12 ]) , if t1 odd .
(84)
This follows from the construction of the adaptive diffusion. The protocol follows a binomial distribution with parameter q
until (T1 − 1). At time T1, one of the following can happen: the virtual source can only be passed (the first equation in (83)),
it can only stay (the second equation in (84)), or both cases are possible (the second equation in (83)).
Given T1, Q and D, which are revealed under the adversarial model we consider, the above formula implies that the posterior
distribution of the source also follows a binomial distribution. Hence, the ML estimate is the mode of a binomial distribution
43
with a shift, for example when t1 is even, ML estimate is the mode of 2 + (t1/2) +Z where Z ∼ Binom((t1/2)− 2, q). The
adversary can compute the ML estimate:
vˆML =

T1+2
2 +
⌊
q
(
T1−2
2
)⌋
if T1 even, D = ` ,
T1+3
2 +
⌊
q
(
T1−1
2
)⌋
if T1 odd, D = ` ,
1 +
⌊
(1− q)
(
T1−1
2
)⌋
if T1 odd, D = r .
(85)
Together with the likelihoods in Eqs. (83) and (84), this gives
P(adaptive)T1,D|V ∗,Q
(
t1, r, vˆML = v
∗∣∣v∗, q) =
1
2
(1− q)B
( t1 − 1
2
− v∗, t1 − 3
2
, q
)
I(vˆML=v∗) I(t1 is odd) (86)
P(adaptive)T1,D|Q
(
t1, r, V
∗ = vˆML
∣∣q) =
=
1
2n
(1− q)B
( t1 − 1
2
− vˆML, t1 − 3
2
, q
)
I(t1 is odd) (87)
≤ (1− q)
2n
(√2 I(t1 is odd and t1 > 3)√
t1−3
2 q(1− q)
+ I(t1=3)
)
(88)
where vˆML = vˆML(t1, q, r) is provided in (85), and the bound on B(·) follows from Gaussian approximation (which gives an
upper bound 1/
√
2pikq(1− q)) and Berry-Esseen theorem (which gives an approximation guarantee of 2×0.4748/√kq(1− q))
[51], for k = (t1 − 3)/2. Marginalizing out T1 ∈ {3, 5, . . . , 2b(n − 1)/2c + 1} and applying an upper bound
∑k
i=1 1/
√
i ≤
2
√
k + 1− 2 ≤ 2√k − 1 +√1/(2(k − 1))− 2 ≤√4(k − 1), we get
P
(
D = r, V ∗ = vˆML, T1 is odd
∣∣Q = q) ≤
(1− q)√2
2n
√
q(1− q)
√
8
⌊n− 1
2
⌋
+
1− q
2n
. (89)
Similarly, we can show that
P
(
D = `, V ∗ = vˆML, T1 is odd
∣∣Q = q) ≤√
2
2n
√
q(1− q)
√
8
⌊n− 1
2
⌋
+
1
n
, (90)
P
(
V ∗ = vˆML, T1 is even
∣∣Q = q) ≤
q
√
2
2n
√
q(1− q)
√
8
⌊n
2
⌋
+
1 + q
2n
, (91)
Summing up,
P(V ∗ = vˆML|Q = q) ≤
√
8
n q (1− q) +
2
n
. (92)
Recall Q is uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. Taking expectation over Q gives
P(V ∗ = vˆML) ≤ pi
√
8
n
+
2
n
, (93)
where we used
∫ 1
0
1/
√
x(1− x)dx = arcsin(1)− arcsin(−1) = pi.
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